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The Challenge of Interpreting 
‘WTO-PLUS’ Provisions
Julia Ya Qin*
This paper seeks to address special interpretive issues raised by the China Accession Protocol, focusing 
on provisions that prescribe more stringent rules for China than generally applicable WTO disciplines. 
These ‘WTO-plus’ provisions have already been involved in several WTO disputes. In the light of these 
disputes, the paper analyzes the interpretive challenge presented by the Protocol and suggests that, to meet 
the challenge, WTO adjudicators need to embrace a more holistic and systemic interpretive approach. The 
paper then proposes three working principles that may help to interpret the WTO-plus provisions of the 
Protocol in a coherent and systematic manner. 
This paper seeks to address special interpretive issues raised by the China Accession Pro-
tocol (the Protocol), focusing on its provisions that prescribe more stringent obligations 
for China than generally applicable WTO disciplines. These so-called ‘WTO-plus’ obli-
gations1 have already been involved in a number of WTO disputes. Yet, how to interpret 
such obligations in a systematic manner remains an open question. 
Interpretation of the Protocol presents a new challenge to the WTO adjudicatory 
body because it contains a large number of substantive obligations of China that exceed 
the requirements of the WTO agreements. Despite its unique content, the Protocol 
needs to be interpreted consistently and coherently with all WTO agreements since it 
has been made an integral part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation (the WTO Agreement). The Protocol, unfortunately, is not a model of clarity. Its 
text is not drafted as tightly as the WTO agreements, and it does not take care to specify 
the  relationship between a WTO-plus provision and the generally applicable WTO 
disciplines. Moreover, the Protocol fails to articulate any rationale for the special obliga-
tions of China, and the negotiating history of the Protocol has not been made public. 
As a result, it can be diffi cult to interpret the Protocol provisions by following a strictly 
applied textualist approach.
Furthermore, the China-specifi c provisions include broad undertakings that go to 
the heart of China’s economic and legal systems. These systemic obligations penetrate 
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School, USA. S.J.D. Harvard Law School. E-mail: <ya.
qin@wayne.edu>. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the inaugural conference of the Society of International 
Economic Law, held in Geneva in July 2008. I wish to thank the conference participants and Steve Charnovitz, Ruosi 
Zhang and Milan G. Hejtmanek for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This study benefi ted from research funding 
provided by Wayne State University.
1 See generally, Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and their Implications for the WTO Legal System – an 
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol’, Journal of World Trade 37, no. 3 (2003): 483–522.
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deeper into the domestic policy domain of a sovereign nation than any other WTO 
agreement. Consequently, how to interpret the scope of such provisions becomes a polit-
ically sensitive matter. The goal, of course, is to give full effect to each of the Protocol 
provisions without improperly intruding into the legitimate policy space of China. How-
ever, given the lack of clear guidance from the treaty, achieving that goal will not be an 
easy task. To meet the challenge, WTO adjudicators will need to embrace a more holistic 
and systemic interpretive approach.
In this paper, I will examine the major interpretive issues involved in the WTO-plus 
provisions and propose three working principles to aid the interpretative process. These 
three principles are as follows: (1) Identifying the baseline. For each WTO-plus provi-
sion at issue, the interpreter should identify, to the extent possible, the corresponding 
provision(s) in the WTO multilateral agreements as the baseline. Locating the baseline 
rules can provide a broader context for the WTO-plus provision and shed light on 
its rationale. (2) Distinguishing systemic commitments from commercial commitments. 
Some of the WTO-plus obligations are commercial commitments in nature, whereas 
others pertain to the reform of China’s domestic system. The level of WTO scrutiny 
should vary depending on the nature of the commitments so that proper balance can be 
drawn between international and national jurisdictions. (3) Giving due consideration to 
China’s intention. Although the Protocol has been made part of a multilateral agreement, 
its obligations are China-specifi c that do not have quid pro quo on the part of other 
WTO Members. In light of the de facto unilateral character of such obligations, special 
care should be taken in ascertaining China’s intention in the interpretive process; when 
in doubt, the Protocol obligations should be interpreted narrowly.
The paper will proceed as follows. Part 1 provides an introduction to the WTO-plus 
obligations of China and an analysis of the legal nature of the Protocol. Part 2 discusses 
the special challenge in the interpretation of the WTO-plus obligations and illustrates 
such challenges by WTO disputes involving such obligations. Part 3 sets forth the three 
proposed working principles for interpreting such obligations. Part 4 concludes.
It should be clarifi ed at the outset that this paper does not deal with the market 
access commitments of China set out its goods and services schedules, which are part of 
the Protocol but are separately incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), respectively. 
Since all market access commitments inscribed in GATT and GATS schedules are coun-
try-specifi c, that is, they vary from Member to Member, the notion of ‘WTO-plus’ does 
not apply to such commitments. Instead, WTO-plus obligations refer to the obligations of 
a Member that go beyond the requirements of generally applicable WTO disciplines.2
2 For a general categorization of ‘WTO-plus’ and ‘WTO-minus’ obligations and a survey of such obligations within 
the WTO system, see Steve Charnovitz, ‘Mapping the Law of WTO Accession’, in The WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement 
& Developing Countries, ed. Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson, & Alan Yanovich (Juris Publishing, 2008), Ch. 46, available 
at: <www.ssrn.com/abstractid=957651>.
 THE CHALLENGE OF INTERPRETING ‘WTO-PLUS’ PROVISIONS  129
1. Introduction
The terms of China’s accession to the WTO are set out in the Protocol on the Accession 
of the People’s Republic of China.3 Like all acceding Members, China was required to 
make its own market-access commitments in goods and services4 and to comply with 
WTO rules of conduct contained in the various substantive agreements annexed to the 
WTO Agreement (collectively, the WTO agreements). Unlike other acceding Members, 
however, the terms of China’s accession also include a large number of special rules that 
are applicable to China only. 5 These China-only rules are found in the main text of the 
Protocol, which consists of 17 sections of substantive provisions and nine annexes, and 
in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (‘WPR’), which has 343 
paragraphs including 143 paragraphs containing substantive obligations that are incorpo-
rated into the Protocol by reference.
The China-only rules can be divided into two major categories: (1) ‘WTO-plus’ 
provisions, which impose on China obligations more stringent that those required by 
the WTO agreements; and (2) ‘WTO-minus’ provisions, which allow other Members 
to deviate from standard WTO disciplines when using trade remedies against Chinese 
exports.6 In addition, there is a set of provisions that obligate China not to seek special 
and differential treatment of developing country Members.7 
1.1 Five types of WTO-plus obligations
The WTO-plus obligations of China are numerous. They range from important systemic 
commitments to purely commercial arrangements. Based on their purposes or rationale, 
these obligations can be viewed as comprising fi ve types:8
1. Obligations to practice market economy. Although its rules are constructed with 
market economy assumptions, the WTO does not prescribe any particular 
3 The Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (10 Nov. 2001), available at: 
<www.wto.org>.
4 China’s market access commitments were extraordinarily extensive in comparison with other WTO members. For 
a comparative perspective on the scope and depth of China’s market access commitments, see Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating 
China into the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 79–80.
5 The only other major exception is Vietnam, which acceded to the WTO in 2007. Following China’s precedent, 
Vietnam’s accession protocol contains a set of special rules that apply solely to Vietnam. These rules are found in the 70 
paragraphs of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam that are incorporated into the accession pro-
tocol. See WT/ACC/VNM/48 (27 Oct. 2006), para. 527. While special rule obligations do exist in other accessions, they 
are relatively few in number. For a comprehensive study of issues arising from special obligations imposed on acceding 
Members, see Charnovitz, supra n. 2.
6 For a summary of the WTO-minus provisions, see Julia Ya Qin, ‘China, India, and the Law of the World Trade 
Organization’, Asian Journal of Comparative Law 3, no. 1 (2008): 215, 222–227.
7 For detailed discussion, see Marcia Don Harpaz, ‘China and the WTO – New Kid in the Developing Bloc?’, 
Hebrew U. of Jerusalem Law Faculty, Research Paper 2–7 (February 2007), Part II, available at: <www.ssrn.com/
abstractid=961768>. See also, Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): A Critical 
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol’, Journal of International Economic Law 7, no. 4 (2004): 863, 907–909.
8 Charnovitz divided such obligations into more groups according to the subject matter, such as industrial policy, 
trade policy, transparency and due process. Charnovitz, supra n. 2, 29–33.
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economic system for its Members.9 While most WTO Members practice mar-
ket economy, they are not legally bound to do so under WTO law. The Pro-
tocol, however, prescribes certain obligations that effectively obligate China to 
practice market economy. For instance, China is required to let market forces 
determine all domestic prices, except for a few specifi ed categories, and is 
not allowed to extend price control beyond these specifi ed categories except 
in exceptional circumstances.10 And within three years of its accession, China 
must completely liberalize its foreign trading regime to allow all domestic and 
foreign persons to engage in importing and exporting.11 As a result of such 
systemic requirements, whether China adopts market economy practices is no 
longer merely a matter of domestic policy, but also a matter of WTO law. 
2. Obligations on domestic governance. The Protocol prescribes a number of spe-
cial obligations concerning domestic governance that exceed the require-
ments of the WTO agreements.12 Such obligations relate to transparency, 
due process, regulatory independence, and uniform administration of law. 
For instance, the Protocol requires China to provide a reasonable period for 
public comment on ‘all laws, regulations and measures’ pertaining to WTO 
matters before their implementation13 and to translate all of such laws, regu-
lations and measures into one of the three offi cial languages of the WTO 
within ninety days of their implementation.14 No such general obligations 
exist under the WTO agreements.
3. Obligations on foreign direct investment. Existing WTO disciplines do not cover 
foreign investment except for measures directly affecting trade in goods or 
services specifi cally included in the GATS schedules.15 The Protocol, by con-
trast, contains signifi cant commitments by China regarding foreign invest-
ment. For instance, China agreed not to condition government approval of 
foreign investment projects upon the existence of competing domestic sup-
pliers or upon any performance requirement, including transfer of technology 
and the conduct of research and development in China.16 Most importantly, 
the Protocol requires China to grant national treatment to foreign investors 
and foreign-invested enterprises with respect to all conditions affecting their 
production and sales in China,17 which goes well beyond the national treat-
ment requirements of the WTO agreements. 
 9 For example, Cuba, despite its nonmarket economy, is an original Member of the WTO. In the prior accessions of 
transition economies (former centrally planned economies undergoing transformation to market economies), the acceding 
countries were typically required to confi rm the status of their economic reforms, but none was obligated to undertake 
substantive obligations to practice market economy. See Qin, supra n. 1, 504.
10 See Protocol, s. 9.
11 See Protocol, s. 5.1.
12 See Qin, supra n. 1, 491–499, for more detailed discussion.
13 Protocol, s. 2(C)(2). Exceptions are given to laws and regulations involving national security or publication of 
which would impede law enforcement.
14 WPR, para. 334, which was incorporated into the Protocol.
15 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and GATS schedule mode 3 (commercial 
presnce).
16 Protocol, s. 7(3). 
17 Protocol, s. 3.
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4. Obligations to eliminate export tariffs. While reducing import tariffs is an essen-
tial part of the GATT discipline, the WTO has not imposed similar obliga-
tions on export tariffs, even though the use of export quotas or quantitative 
restrictions is prohibited.18 Consequently, WTO Members remain free to levy 
tariffs on their exports, which can achieve the same effect as quantitative 
restrictions. Signifi cantly departing from this norm, the Protocol imposes on 
China an obligation to ‘eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports’ 
except for 84 specifi c types of products. For these products, the Protocol sets 
maximum export duty rates, which may not be raised by China except under 
exceptional circumstances and after consultations with affected members.19
5. Market access commitments that do not fi t into the GATT or GATS schedule. Mar-
ket access commitments of WTO Members are set out in GATT and GATS 
schedules. In the case of China, however, additional market access commit-
ments were made in the Protocol. For example, China agreed to remove 
the 50% foreign equity limit for joint-ventures manufacturing motor vehicle 
engines, and to raise gradually the limit within which foreign investments in 
motor vehicle manufacturing can be approved solely by the provincial govern-
mental level.20 These are market access commitments on foreign investment 
in a manufacturing sector, which do not fi t into either the goods or services 
schedule. Another example is China’s commitment to bind future tariffs on 
certain automobile products if it ever creates new tariff lines for them.21
Of the fi ve types of WTO-plus obligations, those concerning market economy practice 
are the most broad systemic commitments of China. As a result of these commitments, 
China is no longer free to alter the direction and results of its market-oriented reforms.22 
And failure to honour these commitments will incur the consequences of violating 
WTO law. The obligations on domestic governance are also systemic commitments. 
Unlike the obligations to practice market economy, however, the special commitments 
of China on transparency, due process, and administration of law are built upon explicit, 
existing WTO norms. While these commitments may have a signifi cant infl uence on the 
development of rule of law in China, they do not impact China’s economic system in 
the same manner as the market economy commitments.
Compared to the systemic commitments, the obligations on foreign investment and 
on export tariffs are more of commercial commitments in nature. Although they embody 
important industrial and trade policies, these obligations are essentially China’s commit-
ments to liberalize trade and investment unilaterally. As for the market access commit-
ments that do not fi t into the goods and services schedules, they are entirely commercial 
concessions of China, analogous to those contained in the schedules.
18 GATT, Art. XI.
19 Protocol, s. 11(3); Annex 6.
20 WPR paras 206–207, which were incorporated into the Protocol.
21 WPR para. 93, which commitment was the subject matter of a WTO complaint. See infra Part 2.2.1.
22 For domestic legal implications of these commitments, see Julia Ya Qin, ‘The Impact of WTO Accession on 
China’s Legal System: Trade, Investment and Beyond’, Wayne State U. Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no 
7–15, 8–10 (May 2007), <www.ssrn.com/abstractid=985321>.
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1.2 Legal nature of the protocol obligations
The Protocol was concluded between China and the WTO pursuant to Article XII of 
the WTO Agreement, which provides that a country may accede to the WTO Agree-
ment ‘on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO’.23 Historically, the terms of 
accession typically consisted of market access commitments of the acceding country, set 
out in the goods and services schedules annexed to its protocol of accession. Such terms 
of accession would not affect the rules of the WTO multilateral agreements. But since 
Article XII does not place any limit on the ‘terms’ that can be negotiated in accession, 
the existing Members can also demand special rule commitments from the acceding 
country that modify the obligations of the acceding Member under the WTO agree-
ments.24 In the case of China, such demand has resulted in the large number of WTO-
plus and WTO-minus provisions. 
Given that the Protocol terms modify the rules of the WTO agreements when 
applied to China, it becomes imperative that their interpretation be based on a clear 
understanding of the relationship between the Protocol and the WTO agreements. Such 
a relationship is complicated by the dual treaty status of the Protocol. Technically, the 
Protocol is a bilateral treaty between China and the WTO; but it also constitutes part 
of the WTO Agreement, a multilateral treaty among WTO Members. In addition, the 
Protocol demonstrates a distinct unilateral character when it prescribes special obligations 
of China that do not have quid pro quo on the part of other WTO Members. These 
special characteristics of the Protocol have implications not only for the interpretation, 
but also the enforcement and amendment of its provisions. 
1.2.1 Bilateral, Multilateral or Unilateral Obligations?
Since the Protocol was concluded between China and the WTO, it is technically a 
bilateral treaty between a state and an international organization.25 As an international 
organization, the WTO’s decision to approve the Protocol was made by the Ministerial 
Conference by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO.26 This decision binds 
all WTO Members, including all countries that join the WTO after China’s accession, 
and subjects their trade relations with China to the Protocol terms unless they expressly 
invoke the non-application clause of the WTO Agreement.27
23 WTO Agreement, Art. XII:1. This provision follows similar language contained in the accession provision of 
GATT Art. XXXIII.
24 See Qin, supra n. 1, 487–489; Charnovitz, supra n. 2, 6–10.
25 The rules governing agreements between a State and an international organization are set out in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (21 
Mar. 1986) (VCLTIO) (not yet in force). The VCLTIO was developed by the International Law Commission and opened 
for signature in 1986. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15.
26 WTO Agreement, Art. XII:2.
27 Pursuant to Art. XIII (Non-Application) of the WTO Agreement, an existing Member has the right not to con-
sent to the application of the WTO Agreement between it and an acceding member; and the acceding member also has 
the right to invoke nonapplication to an existing member. El Salvador invoked Art. XIII in the accession of China. See 
WTO Analytical Index: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. XIII, available at: <www.
wto.org>.
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Section I.2 of the Protocol provides: ‘This Protocol ... shall be an integral part of 
the WTO Agreement.’28 By virtue of this integration clause, the Protocol provisions have 
become part of a multilateral agreement. As a formal matter, it remains unclear how a 
bilateral treaty between a State and the WTO could transform itself into a multilateral 
treaty among WTO Members.29 Nonetheless, the integration is legally effective because 
China, the party that undertakes all the substantive obligations under the Protocol, has 
consented to it.
But has the integration clause taken away the bilateral status of the Protocol under 
international law?30 Absent explicit language of the Protocol to that effect, it is diffi cult 
to conclude that the Protocol has ceased to be a treaty between China and the WTO. A 
better understanding, in my view, is that the integration clause has provided the Protocol 
provisions with an additional multilateral status. Whether the Protocol should be treated 
as a bilateral or multilateral instrument may depend on the purpose of the inquiry, as 
will be further discussed below. 
Irrespective of whether it is considered a bilateral or multilateral instrument, the 
Protocol has a distinct unilateral character because it contains a large number of spe-
cial obligations that are uniquely those of China. To the extent that they exceed the 
requirements of the WTO agreements, these obligations are de facto unilateral commit-
ments undertaken by the Chinese government. But that is not to say that the Protocol 
is a unilateral instrument. The terms of the Protocol were agreed between China and 
WTO Members after years of negotiation. Clearly, China undertook these commit-
ments in exchange for its membership in the WTO, which brings to it all the benefi ts 
of the membership subject only to the limits set by the Protocol. Hence, the Protocol 
obligations are ‘unilateral’ only in the sense, and to the extent, that they differ from the 
multilateral obligations of the WTO Members and do not have quid pro quo on the 
part of other Members.
1.2.2. Implications for Amendment
Normally, there is no need to amend a WTO accession protocol since such an instru-
ment typically consists of procedural provisions for the accession and the goods and ser-
vices schedules of the acceding Member, which can be amended pursuant to the relevant 
GATT and GATS provisions.31 But because the Protocol contains numerous substantive 
28 Protocol, s. I.2.
29 Charnovitz questions the competence of the WTO Ministerial Conference to conclude a protocol with a State 
and thereby make the protocol part of the WTO Agreement. He suggests, correctly in my view, that the proper way to 
integrate the terms of accession into the WTO Agreement should be for the WTO Agreement to so state. See Charnovitz, 
supra n. 2, 42–46.
30 The Protocol is registered with the United Nations in accordance with Art. 102 of the UN Charter. 2183 UNTS 
138 (2004). In the UN Treaty Series, all WTO protocols of accession are registered as ‘Multilateral’ under the same reg-
istration number (A-31874), which follows the registration number for the WTO Agreement (I-31874). Registration of 
an instrument with the United Nations, however, does not confer any legal status the instrument does not already have. 
Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112.
31 See GATT Art. XXVIII (Modifi cation of Schedules); GATS Art. XXI (Modifi cation of Schedules).
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provisions that modify the rights and obligations of China and other Members under the 
WTO Agreement, there should be a clear procedure for the amendment of Protocol pro-
visions. Unfortunately, the Protocol is completely silent in this respect. While the need 
for amending the Protocol may seem remote at the moment, one cannot rule out such 
a possibility for the future. Indeed, if China continues to lose cases in disputes involv-
ing Protocol obligations, it may seek to renegotiate some of the Protocol terms, such as 
revising the list of products subject to export tariffs.32 
The requirements for amendment would differ depending on whether the Protocol 
is treated as a bilateral treaty or a multilateral agreement. If the Protocol is deemed part 
of the WTO Agreement, then its amendment should be made pursuant to Article X 
(Amendments) of the WTO Agreement. According to Article X, amendments to the 
provisions of the WTO Agreement that would alter the rights and obligations of the 
Members shall take effect upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and only for 
each of the Members that has accepted them.33 Because the ‘acceptance’ by the Members 
means that the Members must comply with their respective domestic legal procedures 
for approval of a treaty amendment, which for some Members require ratifi cation by leg-
islature, amending the Protocol would likely be extremely diffi cult if not impossible.34 
By contrast, if the Protocol is treated as a bilateral treaty between China and the 
WTO, its amendment will take effect upon mutual consent of China and the WTO. The 
WTO consent would be obtained through its internal decision-making procedures.35 
Under Article IX (Decision-Making) of the WTO Agreement, a majority of the votes 
cast is suffi cient to make such a decision,36 and the decision so made would be binding 
on all Members of the WTO. Alternatively, it might also be appropriate to apply the 
procedures of Article XII (Accession), mutatis mutandis, to the revision of the Protocol, 
which would require a two-thirds majority for approval. Either way, when the Protocol 
is treated as a bilateral treaty, its amendment will not require formal acceptance (ratifi ca-
tion) by the individual Members.
In my view, for the purpose of amendment, it is more appropriate to treat the 
Protocol as a bilateral agreement than a multilateral agreement. Formally, as long as the 
Protocol remains a treaty between China and the WTO, its amendment should be made 
by agreement between the two parties.37 The question is whether, by the  integration 
32 See infra Part 2.2.4 (China – Exportation of Raw Materials).
33 WTO Agreement, Art. X:3.
34 To date, the only formal amendment to an annex of the WTO Agreement that has been adopted by the General 
Council is the 2005 amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Amendment of TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (8 Dec. 2005). The amendment has not taken effect since it has not received 
acceptance by two thirds of the Members. As of May 2009, only 21 Members (counting the EC as one) have accepted the 
amendment.
35 See VCLTIO, supra n. 25, Art. 39(2) (stating that the consent of an international organization to the agreement to 
amend a treaty ‘shall be governed by the rules of that organization’).
36 Article IX. It should be noted that in practice the WTO resorts to consensus in most of its decision-making pro-
cesses. For discussion, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, ‘Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: 
Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on 
International Trade?’, Journal International Economic Law 8, no. 1 (2005): 51–75.
37 See VCLTIO, supra n. 25, Art. 39(1) (General Rule Regarding the Amendment of Treaties) (stating that ‘[a] treaty may 
be amended by agreement between the parties’).
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clause, the parties have implicitly agreed that amendment of the Protocol should instead 
be handled by the procedures under Article X of the WTO Agreement. This is a ques-
tion of interpreting the scope of the integration clause, for which the answer will remain 
uncertain until the parties clarify their intentions. In practice, however, choosing to 
amend the Protocol through the procedures of Article X would be tantamount to closing 
the door to virtually any amendment. (Imagine the diffi culty of requiring two thirds of 
the WTO Members to go through their respective domestic procedures for treaty ratifi -
cation just to approve a change in the list of Chinese products subject to export tariffs.) 
It seems rather drastic that China should be given no realistic chance to renegotiate any 
term of the Protocol, be it a systemic commitment or a commitment of pure commercial 
nature. In addition, from a procedural perspective, it would not make sense to impose 
more stringent requirements for approving an amendment than those for approving the 
original terms of the Protocol under Article XII.38 It is for these reasons that I believe 
the amendment of the Protocol should be made bilaterally. 
1.2.3. Implications for Enforcement
The Protocol does not contain any provision on the settlement of disputes arising from 
its provisions. Nonetheless, thanks to the integration clause, the Protocol has become 
enforceable against China by individual Members of the WTO. Since the WTO Agree-
ment is a ‘covered agreement’ under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),39 the 
integration of the Protocol into the WTO Agreement makes the DSU applicable to the 
disputes arising from the Protocol. The legal basis for the enforceability of the Protocol 
through the DSU lies ultimately in China’s consent, implicitly expressed in the integra-
tion clause. (This understanding has since been confi rmed by China’s acceptance of 
the jurisdiction of the WTO panels over disputes arising from its Protocol obligations.) 
Without such consent, it is doubtful that Members of the WTO, who are not parties to 
the Protocol in their individual capacity, would be able to sue China directly for breach 
of its Protocol obligations.40 
In theory, the Protocol, being a bilateral treaty, should be enforceable against China 
by the WTO directly. However, as a practical matter, the WTO would have little effec-
tive means to seek such enforcement since it does not have access to its internal dispute 
settlement mechanism41 and the Protocol does not provide any separate means for dis-
pute resolution.
38 Furthermore, theoretically, applying Art. X to the amendment of the Protocol could also lead to a strange result: an 
amendment could take effect without China’s acceptance, so long as it is accepted by two thirds of the Members.
39 DSU Art. 1 and Appendix 1.
40 It should be made clear that the integration clause is only necessary to confer WTO jurisdiction over disputes 
arising from the Protocol provisions. For disputes against China arising from the WTO multilateral agreements, the DSU 
automatically applies by virtue of China’s accession. If the Protocol had not been made part of a ‘covered agreement’, 
individual Members would have to rely on non-violation complaints under GATT and GATS to enforce China’s commit-
ments in the Protocol. The scope of such complaints, however, is limited. See GATT Art. XXIII:1(b), GATS Art. XXIII:3, 
DSU Art. 26.
41 The DSU applies to disputes between WTO Members only. DSU Art. 1.
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1.2.4. Implications for Interpretation
Whether the Protocol is considered as a bilateral treaty or part of a multilateral agree-
ment, its interpretation is governed by the interpretive principles set out in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the VCLT).42 Although the 
VCLT applies to treaties between States43 and not to treaties between a State and an 
international organization,44 the interpretive principles of the VCLT have attained the 
status of customary international law,45 and as such, they apply to agreements between 
all subjects of international law, including international organizations.46 
In accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT, ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. What constitutes the ‘con-
text’ of the terms of the Protocol or its ‘object and purpose’, however, may depend on 
whether the Protocol is treated as a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Under Article 31, 
the ‘context’ of a treaty and items that ‘shall be taken into account together with the 
context’ comprise essentially agreements reached by the ‘parties’ to the treaty.47 Since the 
‘parties’ to the Protocol are China and the WTO, interpreting the Protocol as a bilateral 
treaty might exclude all WTO agreements – none of which was concluded between 
China and the WTO – from being considered as the ‘context’ of the Protocol.48 That 
would be patently contrary to the intent of the parties. The Protocol would have no 
meaning unless it is interpreted in the context of the WTO Agreement. Hence, for the 
purpose of interpretation, it seems only appropriate to treat the Protocol as ‘an integral 
part’ of the WTO Agreement.
42 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969; entered into force on 27 Jan. 1980. 1155 UNTS 331.
43 VCLT, Art. 1.
44 The VCLTIO, supra n. 25, contains identical provisions on treaty interpretation as the VCLT. Other than provisions 
pertaining to the legal capacity of international organization, the substantive rules of the VCLTIO are essentially the same 
as the VCLT.
45 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996, 17.
46 According to Art. 3(2) the VCLT, the fact that the Convention does not apply to agreements concluded between 
States and other subjects of international law does not affect the application to them of the rules set out in the Convention 
to which they would otherwise be subject under international law.
47 Article 31(2) and (3) of the VCLT states: 
‘2.The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the con-
clusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.
48 It might be argued that the ‘parties’ to the Protocol should be construed as de facto encompassing all Members 
of the WTO in their individual capacity; but such a construction does not seem consistent with the literal interpretation of 
the provisions in Art. 31 of the VCLT.
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To interpret the Protocol as part of the WTO Agreement raises the issue of how the 
Protocol relates to the various agreements that are annexed to the WTO Agreement. In gen-
eral, it can be assumed that the Protocol, which covers subject matters across various WTO 
agreements, prevails over these agreements to the extent that its terms differ from theirs. 
This assumption is premised on Article XII of the WTO Agreement, which explicitly allows 
accession to be conditioned ‘on terms to be agreed’ between the acceding country and 
the WTO, and mandates that such conditioned accession ‘shall apply’ to the WTO Agree-
ment and the multilateral trade agreements annexed thereto. Thus, when the terms of the 
accession protocol differ from the WTO agreements, such terms can modify the provisions 
of the WTO agreements as applied between the acceding Member and other  Members.49 
Defi ning the general hierarchy between the Protocol and the WTO agreements, however, 
does not solve all the interpretive issues arising from the relationship between a particular 
Protocol provision and the WTO agreements. As will be demonstrated below, the lack of 
a clearly defi ned relationship between specifi c Protocol provisions and generally applicable 
WTO provisions gives rise to many issues in the interpretation of the Protocol.
To interpret the Protocol as part of the multilateral treaty does not necessarily mean 
the bilateral status of the Protocol would have no bearing on the matter of its interpre-
tation. For one thing, so long as the Protocol remains formally an agreement between 
China and the WTO, legally there is nothing to prevent the two parties from entering 
into a new agreement regarding the interpretation or application of the Protocol.50 
Such an agreement would constitute ‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of 
Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, which a treaty interpreter would be obliged to take into account 
in the interpretation of the Protocol. Indeed, if China and the WTO could ever conclude 
an agreement clarifying the relationship between the Protocol and the WTO agreements, 
such agreement would be the most ‘authoritative interpretation’ of the Protocol.
In comparison, ‘authoritative interpretations’ of the WTO Agreement can only be 
made by the ‘legislature’ of the WTO. Under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of the WTO Agreement, and the decision to adopt such interpretations 
shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members. In contrast with the judicial 
interpretations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which bind the parties to 
a particular dispute only, an authoritative interpretation adopted under Article IX:2 may 
bind all Members.51 Thus, if the Protocol is treated as part of the WTO Agreement for 
the purpose of Article IX:2, a three quarters of the Members can adopt an  interpretation 
49 This understanding is also consistent with para. 2 of Art. 30 (Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject 
matter) of the VCLT, and the same provision of the VCLTIO, which states: ‘When a treaty specifi es that it is subject to, or that 
it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.’ Insofar 
as the relationship between China and other Members is concerned, the Protocol and the WTO Agreement (together with 
its annexes) can be deemed as ‘successive treaties relating to the same subject matter’. And Art. XII of the WTO Agreement 
can be understood as specifying that its application is subject to the terms of accession.
50 For further interpretive implications of the bilateral status of the Protocol, see text at infra n. 193.
51 See generally, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, ‘The Authoritative Interpretation under Art. IX:2 of 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements’, Journal of 
International Economic Law 8, no. 4 (2005): 803–824.
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of the Protocol irrespective of China’s opinion. Such an interpretation would be bind-
ing on China as a matter of WTO law.52 Given the de facto unilateral character of the 
Protocol obligations, however, it is questionable whether an authoritative interpretation 
of the Protocol should be made without China’s consent.53 Such consent may have been 
given implicitly through the integration clause, but that remains to be clarifi ed.
Whether an interpretation of the Protocol is performed by the WTO ‘legislature’ or 
the WTO adjudicatory body, the de facto unilateral character of the Protocol obligations 
should not be ignored in the interpretive process. To the extent that such obligations 
exceed the requirements of the generally applicable WTO disciplines, it may be appro-
priate for the treaty interpreter to make certain adjustments in applying the interpretive 
principles of the VCLT, as will be discussed in Part 3.
2. The Interpretive Challenge
2.1. What is the special challenge?
2.1.1. Imperfect Formulation of the Protocol
In the interpretation of WTO agreements, the WTO adjudicatory body has adopted a 
textualist approach that appears to apply the VCLT rules rather mechanically. In their deci-
sions, the panels and the Appellate Body typically examine each element of Article 31 in 
sequence – fi rst the words, then the context, and the object and purpose. Among these ele-
ments, words are given a clear priority, the meaning of which is determined by fi rst look-
ing up their dictionary defi nitions.54 The judicial policy of the Appellate Body, to quote 
one of its former members, appeared as ‘belonging to the strict constructionist school that 
interprets texts literally and narrowly’.55 Although the Appellate Body, responding to criti-
cism, has more recently stated that interpretation pursuant to the VCLT rules ‘is ultimately 
a holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid components’,56 
it remains to be seen to what extent their interpretive approach has changed.
The ‘strict constructionist school’, in any event, will not work well in the interpreta-
tion of the Protocol. First of all, the text of many Protocol provisions was not drafted as 
52 Because interpretations adopted under Art. IX:2 are binding on all Members, they may have similar effect as 
amendment. Note that Art. IX:2 states that its provision ‘shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amend-
ment provisions in Article X’.
53 Without China’s consent, an authoritative interpretation of the Protocol adopted under Art. IX:2 would not 
qualify as ‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of Art. 31(3) of the VCLT.
54 ‘The Shorter Oxford Dictionary is perhaps the most quoted title in the Appellate Body reports, in any case, 
more than any covered agreement’. George Abi-Saab, ‘The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation’, in The WTO at 
Ten, The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System, ed. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich, & Jan Bohanes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 453, 461. It appears that the Appellate Body has moved away from the obsessive reli-
ance on dictionary defi nitions. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classifi cation of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269, 286/AB/R, adopted 27 Sep. 2005, (‘EC – Chicken Cuts’), para. 175 (stating that 
while dictionaries are ‘useful starting point’ for the analysis of ordinary meaning of a treaty term, they are not necessarily 
dispositive).
55 Abi-Saab, id.
56 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 176.
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tightly and carefully as that of the WTO multilateral agreements. This is especially true 
with the commitments set out in the Working Party Report that were incorporated into 
the Protocol by reference. One salient example of such loose drafting is paragraph 18 of the 
Working Party Report, which contains a national treatment clause of a sweeping scope:
The representative of China further confi rmed that China would provide the same treatment to 
Chinese enterprises, including foreign-funded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals 
in China. (emphasis added)
The text of this commitment is fairly unambiguous.57 But it is hard to believe such 
unqualifi ed national treatment was intended by the Chinese government or expected by 
other Members.58
Next, it can be diffi cult to defi ne the ‘context’ of the Protocol terms. The Protocol 
addresses subject matters across the various WTO agreements, and as such, its terms need 
to be read consistently and harmoniously with all other applicable provisions of the WTO 
agreements.59 Yet, the Protocol does not always specify how its terms relate to the WTO 
provisions addressing the same subject matter. With respect to the WTO-plus obligations, 
the lack of a clearly defi ned relationship with WTO agreements raises at least one major 
interpretive issue: whether the general exceptions available under the WTO agreements, 
such as GATT Article XX, should apply to the relevant obligations in the Protocol. In 
the Appellate Body’s practice, ‘resort to context in interpretation, though frequent, can 
be rather guarded, particularly when it implies going from one covered agreement to 
another’.60 Given this practice, how to fi ll the large gaps between the Protocol and other 
covered agreements can be a major challenge for the WTO adjudicators.
Furthermore, it may not be easy to identify the object and purpose of a Protocol 
provision. Although ‘object and purpose’ is much less referred to in the Appellate Body 
reports, ‘much of the reasoning in [its] interpretation is informed by the object and 
purpose, either consciously or subconsciously, where they can be identifi ed’.61 Unfortu-
nately, the Protocol contains no preambular language setting out its objectives, nor any 
provision explaining the rationale of the special obligations imposed on China. While the 
overall purpose of the Protocol is evidently to integrate China into the WTO system, 
that general objective does not shed more light on a specifi c provision of the Protocol 
57 The format of this provision is highly unusual for a national treatment clause. First, this commitment does not 
place any limit on the scope of the ‘same treatment’. Second, it uses the term ‘same treatment’, rather than the commonly 
used phrase ‘treatment no less favourable than’, as in GATT Art. III:4 and GATS Art. XVII. The ‘same treatment’ require-
ment raises the question of whether China can grant foreign persons more favourable treatment than that to its domestic 
persons, such as providing special incentives to foreign investors.
58 In fact, para. 17 of the Working Party Report noted that ‘any commitment to provide non-discriminatory treat-
ment to Chinese enterprises, including foreign-funded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals in China, would 
be subject to other provisions of the Draft Protocol and, in particular, would not prejudice China’s rights under the GATS, 
China’s Schedule of Specifi c Commitments or commitments undertaken in relation to trade related investment measures’. 
Curiously, though, this statement is not binding since para. 17 was not incorporated into the Protocol.
59 See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Defi nitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 Jan. 2000, para. 81.
60 Abi-Saab, supra n. 54, 462.
61 Abi-Saab, id. Apparently, the discussion of object and purpose ‘does not sit well with strict constructionism’ since 
it leads to teleological interpretation. Id.
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than the general objective of liberalizing trade does on any specifi c provision of the 
WTO agreements.
Finally, it is unclear whether there is a negotiating record to aid the interpreta-
tion of the Protocol. The WTO adjudicatory body has not infrequently resorted to the 
negotiating history of GATT and of the Uruguay Round as a supplementary means of 
interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT. Unlike negotiations of the GATT 1947 and 
the Uruguay Round agreements, the records for which have been made generally avail-
able, the accession negotiations were conducted between China on the one hand, and 
the incumbent WTO members, collectively and individually, on the other. It is unclear 
whether offi cial records were kept for all those talks, and if so, whether they would be 
made available to the public.62 The lack of the preparatory work would deprive the 
WTO adjudicatory body of a major supplementary means of interpretation. 
In short, the imperfect formulation of the Protocol can make it diffi cult for the 
WTO adjudicatory body to follow its usual steps in applying the VCLT rules. Instead, 
it may need to embrace a more fl exible and holistic approach in the interpretation of 
the Protocol.
2.1.2. The Challenge of Systemic Issues
An underlying assumption of the China-only obligations is that the Chinese system is 
not fully compatible with the foundations of the WTO system and that such incompat-
ibility needs to be addressed by certain China-specifi c rules. In other words, the special 
provisions are considered necessary to ensure that WTO disciplines will not be rendered 
ineffective in China. Surely not all China-specifi c obligations can be explained by this 
rationale. In fact, some major WTO-plus obligations of China, such as those regarding 
foreign investment and export tariffs, have nothing to do with safeguarding the existing 
WTO disciplines.63 Nonetheless, many provisions of the Protocol do refl ect concerns on 
the part of WTO Members over the issue of systemic compatibility. Prominent among 
them are the WTO-plus provisions concerning market economy practices and domestic 
governance, some of which have already been involved in WTO disputes.64 
Interpreting these Protocol provisions can be most challenging because they address 
issues of domestic policies at a systemic level that is unprecedented in the history of the 
world trading system. Traditionally, the GATT system focused on border measures, and 
its regulation of domestic measures was very much limited to the requirement of nondis-
crimination. Although the WTO has greatly expanded the trade disciplines into areas that 
are traditionally domestic regulatory domains (such as services, health and safety standards, 
and intellectual property rights), none of the WTO agreements imposes broad systemic 
obligations as the Protocol does. Yet, interpreting the expanded disciplines has already 
62 For domestic political reasons, China might not agree to disclose such records.
63 For detailed discussion, see Qin, supra n. 1.
64 See Part 2.2 infra.
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proven a major challenge. Some high-profi led cases involving domestic regulations that 
are nondiscriminatory on their face, such as US–Gambling65 and EC–Hormones,66 have 
resulted in noncompliance by the losing parties. Such unsatisfactory outcomes undermine 
the effectiveness of the WTO system and also raise questions about the wisdom of the 
WTO decisions.67 The fundamental challenge for the WTO adjudicatory body is how to 
defi ne proper boundaries between WTO and national jurisdictions over domestic policies 
which, while affecting trade interests, implicate important societal values of the Member 
countries. The Appellate Body has yet to demonstrate a systematic approach for handling 
such politically sensitive cases.
Moreover, there is a tendency on the part of the Appellate Body to shun systemic 
or policy discussions. As noted above, the Appellate Body is more inclined to limit its 
legal reasoning to textual and contextual analyses, than placing such analyses in the light 
of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty provision explicitly, which would entail a seri-
ous inquiry into the underlying policy considerations.68 Some critics have described such 
tendency as ‘textual fetishism and policy phobia’.69 While there may be sound reasons 
for the Appellate Body to choose such an interpretive approach (that is, to ensure the 
legitimacy of its decisions and to avoid criticism of judicial activism), its reluctance to 
discuss the systemic or policy dimension of the treaty provisions does not bode well for 
the interpretation of the Protocol provisions that are meant to address systemic issues.
It should be noted that, to avoid dealing with systemic issues, the WTO adjudica-
tory body may employ certain ‘issue-avoidance’ techniques, such as judicial economy and 
non liquet.70 Although invoking non liquet (which occurs when a judiciary body decides 
not to rule on a case because the law is not clear) is generally disfavoured, in light of 
the special circumstances of the Protocol, a strong argument can be made that when 
65 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 Apr. 2005. At issue was the US ban on Internet gambling, which was found by 
the WTO adjudicatory body to be inconsistent with the GATS. Instead of changing its domestic regulation, the United 
States has withdrawn its relevant concessions from the GATS schedule, and accepted the sanction by the complainant 
(Antigua and Barbuda) in the form of suspension of TRIPS obligations at the level of USD 21 million per year.
66 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 Feb. 1998. At issue was the EC ban on hormone-treated meat, 
which was found by the Appellate Body to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. The ban has enjoyed a wide support 
in the EU public. Because the EC has not withdrawn the ban, the complainants (the Unite States and Canada) have been 
imposing sanctions on EC products since 1999. The EC, however, challenged such sanctions by bringing its own complaints 
in 2004. See Appellate Body Report, Canada/United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 
WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 Nov. 2008. The case has developed into an intractable dispute.
67 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT 
and GATS’, World Trade Review 4, no. 2 (2005): 131–170; Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Highway XIV Revisited: The Road of Non-
discrimination to Market Access in GATS’, World Trade Review 6, no. 1 (2007): 1–23; Federico Ortino, ‘Treaty Interpretation 
and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – Gambling: A Critique’, Journal of International Economic Law 9, no. 1 (2006): 
117–148; Alan O. Sykes, ‘Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty and Scientifi c Evidence Requirements’, in Trade and Human 
Health and Safety, ed. George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 257; 
Caroline E. Foster, ‘Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures’, Journal of International Economic Law 11, no. 2 (2008): 427–458.
68 Supra n. 61.
69 Douglas A. Irwin & Joseph Weiler, ‘Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (DS 285)’, World Trade Review 7, no. 1 (2008): 71, 89–95.
70 For discussion of the various ‘issue-avoidance’ techniques that may be used by the WTO adjudicator, see William 
Davey, ‘Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority?’ Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2001): 
79, 96–110.
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encountering a genuine indeterminacy in the Protocol provisions, the WTO adjudica-
tory body would be justifi ed to declare non liquet.71 In principle, large gaps in treaties 
should be fi lled by WTO Members, not by panels or the Appellate Body. But when 
‘legislative’ interpretation is not forthcoming,72 in the interest of resolving disputes, the 
WTO adjudicatory body may be compelled to fi ll such gaps, no matter how undesirable 
it might be from an institutional perspective.
2.2. Disputes involving WTO-plus provisions
Claims regarding WTO-plus obligations of China have already been made in several 
WTO disputes. This section discusses four cases involving such claims. At the time of 
writing, one of these cases has been decided, one settled, and two are ongoing. The 
WTO-plus provisions involved in these cases range from purely commercial commit-
ments on future tariff bindings and export duties to systemic commitments on trading 
rights and regulatory independence.
2.2.1. China–Auto Parts73
This is the fi rst case brought against China that has gone through the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings.74 It involves three complaints brought by the EU, the United 
States, and Canada, respectively. At issue were Chinese regulations imposing a surcharge 
on imported automobile parts that are used in assembling vehicles for sale in China. 
This surcharge effectively raised China’s tariff rates for auto parts from 10% to 25%, 
which is the tariff rate for complete vehicles. China’s rationale for the surcharge was that 
if the auto parts imported possess the ‘essential character’ of a complete vehicle, then 
they should be charged as compete vehicles. The purpose of the surcharge, according to 
China, was to prevent circumvention of the higher tariff on complete vehicles. Under 
the Chinese regulations, the imports deemed to possess the ‘essential character’ of a com-
plete vehicle included: (a) completely knocked down kits (CKD) or semi-knocked down 
kits (SKD); (b) certain key parts, such as a body or an engine assembly; and (c) parts 
when the total price of which accounts for at least 60% of the total price of a complete 
vehicle. Whether imported parts meet the criteria was to be determined after they were 
assembled into vehicles.
71 See Lorand Bartels, ‘The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism’, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (2004): 861, 873–877 (discussing the possibility and appropriateness of declaring non liquet 
under WTO law).
72 Such ‘legislative’ interpretation should be made by agreement between China and the WTO, or possibly by the 
Ministerial Conference or the General Council pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. See supra discussion sur-
rounding nn. 50–53.
73 China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339, 340, 342.
74 The fi rst WTO complaint against China was China – Value Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (WT/DS/309), which 
was brought by the United States in March 2004. The case was settled through consultations. See WT/DS309/8 (6 Oct. 
2005).
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The complaints claimed that the Chinese regulations violated GATT Articles II 
and III, TRIMS, the SCM Agreement, and the China Accession Protocol. The Protocol 
provision involved was paragraph 93 of the Working Party Report, which sets out a 
special commitment of China on tariffs for CDK and SDK. Paragraph 93 states:
Certain members of the Working Party expressed particular concerns about tariff treatment in 
the auto sector. In response to questions about the tariff treatment for kits for motor vehicles, the 
representative of China confi rmed that China had no tariff lines for completely knocked-down 
kits for motor vehicles or semi-knocked down kits for motor vehicles. If China created such tariff 
lines, the tariff rates would be no more than 10 per cent. The working Party took note of this commit-
ment. (emphasis added)
This commitment is a WTO-plus obligation in the sense that Members are not 
required to make tariff bindings beyond the contents of their goods schedules. The 
United States and Canada75 submitted that China had violated this commitment by 
effectively charging a 25% tariff on CDK and SDK. China countered that no violation 
had occurred because it still had not created separate tariff lines for such kits.
The Panel found in favor of the complainants on practically all their claims, with its 
main fi ndings based on violations by the Chinese measures of GATT Article III.76 On 
appeal by China, the Appellate Body affi rmed the Panel’s main fi ndings, but reversed its 
fi nding on paragraph 93 on the grounds of legal errors.77 As a result, the substantive issue 
arising from the paragraph was left undecided. 
Although the Panel’s fi nding on paragraph 93 was reversed, its interpretation of the 
Protocol is nonetheless noteworthy, given that it is the fi rst such attempt by the WTO 
adjudicatory body. Two observations can be made of the Panel’s decision:
(a) Clarifi cation of the legal status of the Protocol
The Panel fi rst sought to clarify the legal status of China’s obligation under para-
graph 93. It noted:
All parties agree that China’s commitments under its Working Party Report are enforceable in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The Accession Protocol is an integral part of the WTO 
Agreement pursuant to Part I, Article 1.2 of the Accession Protocol. In turn, paragraph 342 of 
China’s Working Party Report incorporates China’s commitments under its Working Party report, 
including paragraph 93, into the Accession Protocol. Therefore, China’s commitment in paragraph 
93 of the Working Party Report is also an integral part of the WTO Agreement. (footnotes 
omitted)
Accordingly, the Panel will interpret China’s commitment under paragraph 93 of the Working 
Party Report in accordance with the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention to determine 
whether China has acted inconsistently with commitments under paragraph 93 of the Working 
Party Report.78
75 The EU did not make a claim regarding para. 93 of the Working Party Report.
76 Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339, 340, 342/R (18 Jul. 2008). The 
Panel exercised judicial economy on claims under TRIMS and the SCM Agreement.
77 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339, 340, 342/AB/R, 
adopted 12 Jan. 2009.
78 Panel Report, paras 7.740–7.741. A note to para. 7.740 states additionally: ‘China considers it appropriate for dis-
pute settlement panels to take into account the context of a commitment made in a working party report, and to exercise 
special care in interpreting these commitments.’ Id., n. 1104.
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The Panel’s statement is signifi cant on two accounts. First, it recorded an explicit agree-
ment between the disputing parties that China’s obligations under the Protocol are 
enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. If there had been any 
doubts previously as to the enforceability of such obligations, the Panel’s statement dis-
pelled them. Second, the Panel declared that it would interpret paragraph 93 as part 
of the WTO Agreement, and that position was accepted by the parties.79 Arguably, the 
Panel’s statement refl ects a ‘subsequent agreement’ regarding the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Protocol provisions within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT.
(b) The Panel’s interpretive approach
It is interesting to observe how the Panel’s approach in the interpretation of para-
graph 93 differs from its approach in the interpretation of the GATT provisions. In 
interpreting the GATT provisions applicable in this case, the Panel faithfully followed all 
the steps in the usual pattern of applying the VCLT by the WTO adjudicatory body. For 
each GATT provision analyzed, the Panel examined, in sequence, the ordinary meaning 
of the words, their context, object and purpose, subsequent practice, and supplementary 
means of interpretation.80 By contrast, in its analysis of paragraph 93, the Panel did not 
mention the ‘ordinary meaning’ of its terms, or identify their context;81 nor did it refer 
to the ‘object and purpose’ or other elements in the VCLT rules. Instead, it addressed the 
substantive issue raised under paragraph 93 directly from a policy perspective.
The single substantive issue under paragraph 93 was: whether China had created 
separate tariff lines for CDK/SDK kits, upon which its commitment of 10% tariff bind-
ing was conditioned. All parties agreed that China had not formally created separate tariff 
lines for CKD and SKD kits. The dispute therefore centred on whether such tariff lines 
could be created in effect. The Panel answered the question in the positive. It found that 
China had imported such kits under the subheadings of ‘complete sets of assemblies’, at 
the ten-digit level, under the tariff heading for ‘motor vehicles’.82 Furthermore, it found 
that a tariff line for such kits could be ‘deemed’ created through the Chinese measures 
at issue.83 Based on these two fi ndings, the Panel concluded that China had fulfi lled the 
condition underlying its commitment under paragraph 93.84 To interpret otherwise, the 
Panel stated, would render China’s commitment meaningless, since it would leave the 
fulfi lment of its underlying condition entirely to China’s own discretion.85 
On appeal, China claimed that the Panel had erred in this interpretation. Among 
other things, China claimed that it had classified CKD/SKD kits at the same ten-digit 
level both before and after its accession to the WTO. 86 Consequently, the condition 
79 The Appellate Body quoted the Panel’s statement in full and noted that ‘neither of these propositions has been 
disputed at any point in these proceedings, including in this appeal’. Appellate Body Report, para. 214.
80 For example, the Panel followed this formula strictly in its analysis of whether China’s treatment of CKD/SKD 
kits is consistent with GATT Art. II:1(b). See Panel Report, paras 7.658–7.735.
81 In defi ning the term ‘tariff lines’, the Panel simply referred to the HS Convention. See id., para. 7.749.
82 Panel Report, para. 7.750.
83 Id., para. 7.755.
84 Id., paras 7.757–7.758.
85 Id., para. 7.756.
86 Appellate Body Report, paras 41–44. The United States and Canada disputed this factual claim. Id., paras 76, 97. 
For facts established in this regard, see infra n. 89.
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underlying its commitment in paragraph 93 could only be the creation of explicit 
tariff lines for such kits, because it would not have made sense to have a commitment 
of continuing its existing practice. The meaning of China’s commitment, however, was 
left undetermined. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings on the grounds 
that it had misconstrued the Chinese regulations in question.87 Having reversed the 
Panel on this legal error, the Appellate Body decided that, given the way in which 
China framed its appeal, it needed not rule on the meaning of paragraph 93.88 
The substantive arguments surrounding the interpretation of paragraph 93 illustrate 
the diffi culties in ascertaining the common intention of the parties behind such ad hoc 
China-specifi c provisions. In order to determine what was intended by China’s com-
mitment, it would be necessary to understand the historical context of and the reason 
for this commitment. Paragraph 93 states that certain members of the Working Party 
expressed ‘particular concerns about tariff treatment in the auto sector’, and that China’s 
commitment was in response to ‘questions about the tariff treatment for kits for motor 
vehicles’. There is, however, no additional text in the Working Party Report or elsewhere 
explaining what those particular concerns were; nor is there negotiating record show-
ing what questions were asked about China’s tariff treatment for such kits at the time. 
Indeed, it was ultimately unclear what tariff treatment China had applied to CDK/SDK 
kits prior to its accession.89 Given the situation, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Panel 
would depart from the standard interpretive formula and made its fi ndings directly from 
a policy perspective (effectiveness of the commitment). It would have been very diffi cult 
to mechanically apply the textualist approach in interpreting China’s commitment under 
paragraph 93. 
2.2.2. China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (the Trading Rights case)90
This case was brought by the United States to challenge China’s restrictions on the import 
and distribution of certain foreign cultural products, including books, magazines, newspa-
pers, sound recordings, audiovisual entertainment products, and movies. The case has two 
87 According to the Appellate Body, since the Panel had (correctly) characterized the charge imposed by the Chinese 
measure as ‘internal charges’ falling under GATT Art. III, it could not logically characterize such charge also as ‘an ordinary 
customs duty’ in violation of China’s commitment under para. 93. Appellate Body Report, paras 230–245.
88 Id., para. 252. The effect of the Appellate Body’s decision is to allow China to continue charging 25% tariffs for 
CDK/SKD kits.
89 The facts established by the Panel are as follows: China maintained separate tariff lines for CDK/SDK kits under 
the tariff headings for motor vehicles from 1991 to 1995. Thereafter, China prohibited the imports of CDK/SDK kits 
offi cially, but continued such imports in practice. From 1996 to 2001 (the time of accession), the separate tariff lines for 
such kits ceased to exist in China’s tariff schedule. The parties however disputed as to how China treated such kits during 
this period. The complainants submitted that China applied tariff rates on such kits based on the negotiations it reached 
with individual auto manufacturers at substantially lower levels than the rates for complete vehicles. China, on the other 
hand, insisted that it always applied the same tariff rates to CDK and SDK kits as those to complete vehicles. In the 
end, the Panel accepted that China had classifi ed the kits as complete vehicles prior to its accession. See Panel Report, 
paras 7.731–7.735.
90 ‘China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products’, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS363/5 (11 Oct. 2007); 
Request for Consultation by the United States, WT/DS363/1(16 Apr. 2007); Addendum, WT/DS363/1/Add.1 (16 Jul. 
2007).
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major components: one concerns China’s obligation to liberalize trading rights under the 
Protocol, the other China’s specifi c commitments on distribution services under GATS. 
At the time of this writing, the Panel has yet to release its decision to the public.
The trading rights claim involves China’s WTO-plus obligation to liberalize trading 
rights within three years of accession. The United States claims that, contrary to its com-
mitment, the Chinese government has not allowed foreign entities and non-state-owned 
Chinese enterprises to import cultural products, and instead has reserved the right to 
import such products to certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
2.2.2.1. Background
Prior to the accession, the government controlled the rights to engage in foreign trade in 
China. It did so by allocating trading rights to approved entities. Typically, the domestic com-
panies receiving trading rights were state-owned. Although all foreign-invested enterprises 
(FIEs) were also allowed to import and export, their rights to trade were generally limited 
to importation for their own production needs and exportation of their own products.91
As part of the accession commitments, China agreed to completely change this 
trading system. Specifi cally, China promised that, within three years of its accession, all 
Chinese enterprises, regardless of their ownership, and all foreign individuals and enter-
prises, whether they invested in China or not, would have the right to import and export 
all goods except for a list of products the trading of which is reserved for specifi c SOEs.92 
This commitment is ‘WTO-plus’ because the WTO does not require its Members to 
limit the extent of their state trading activities. Rather, the WTO discipline on state trad-
ing focuses on the requirement of nondiscrimination.93
To implement the trading rights commitment, China amended its Foreign Trade 
Law in 2004.94 The new law did away with the government approval system and replaced 
it with a simple registration procedure for operating foreign trade businesses in China. 
Under the new system, any person – legal or natural, domestic or foreign – who wishes 
to engage in imports and exports of goods may do so simply by completing the registra-
tion process with the Ministry of Commerce.95 The implementation of this commitment, 
therefore, has fundamentally changed the way in which China conducts its foreign trade.
Despite the fact that cultural products were not among the listed products reserved 
for state trading,96 China has never liberalized the trading rights in foreign cultural 
91 See WPR, para. 80.
92 Section 5 of the Protocol. The trading rights commitment is further elaborated in paras 83 and 84 of the Working 
Party Report.
93 GATT Art. XVII.
94 Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, as amended, effective 1 Jul. 2004.
95 Documents required for registration are mostly for identifi cation purposes. The Ministry of Commerce must 
complete the registration within fi ve days of receipt of the required documents. Foreign Trade Law, Arts 8 and 9.
96 Annex 2A of the Protocol contains a list of 84 products in seven categories (grain, vegetable oil, sugar, tobacco, 
processed oil, chemical fertilizer, and cotton), the import of which can only be conducted by specifi c SOEs; and a list of 
134 agricultural products and commodities (such as tea, grains, metals, coal, oil, silk and cotton), the export of which can 
only be conducted by specifi c SOEs. 
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 products.97 Since the 2004 amendment of the Foreign Trade Law, the Chinese  government 
has reiterated its policy of prohibiting non-state capital from engaging in the import of 
cultural products.98
This prohibition is part of a long-standing policy of the Chinese government. In 
contrast with the extensive liberalization of economy in the past three decades, the gov-
ernment has kept a relatively tight political control over Chinese society. Such control 
is exercised through government censorship of press, media and the Internet, which is 
carried out to a large extent by maintaining state ownership in the media and publish-
ing industries. Under this policy, private capital is prohibited from owning or operating 
news agencies, newspapers, publishing houses, radio broadcasting or TV stations, and 
from engaging in the import of foreign cultural products.99 Consistent with this policy, 
the government has strictly limited foreign investment in the cultural sector. The Indus-
try Catalogue for Foreign Investment, which the government publishes periodically to 
guide foreign direct investment, has consistently listed news organizations, newspapers, 
publishing houses, radio and TV stations, and importation of various cultural products 
under the category of ‘Prohibited’ sectors for foreign investment.100
The dominance of state ownership in China’s cultural sectors is undoubtedly a 
legacy of the centrally-planned economy, but it continues to serve an important function 
in preserving the political control of the Communist Party. Although the state-owned 
media have become increasingly commercialized,101 they remain the ideological tools of 
the Party and are entrusted with the missions of propagating government policies and 
educating and informing the public within the parameters set by the Party. In addition, 
ownership control is critical to China’s censorship regime. Unlike censorship typically 
practiced in other countries, the Chinese authorities rely heavily on self-censorship102 
and constantly adjust censorship criteria.103 By limiting the ‘sensitive’ industries to a 
97 By contrast, exports of Chinese cultural products are not subject to state trading.
 98 See Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, Order [2004] no. 24, State Development and 
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce (30 Nov. 2004) (The Industry Catalogue); The Several Opinions of the 
Ministry of Culture, State Administration of radio, Film and Television, General Administration of Press and Publication, 
national Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce on Introducing Foreign Investment into 
the Cultural Sector, Order [2005] no. 19 of the Ministry of Culture (6 Jul. 2005).
 99 See State Council, Decision Concerning the Entry of Non-State Capital into Cultural Industries (20 Apr. 2005). 
Despite the restriction, however, an increasing number of private companies have entered the publishing business unof-
fi cially and are operating in a grey area.
100 The Industry Catalogue was fi rst promulgated in 1995 and has been revised four times in 1997, 2002, 2004 and 
2007, respectively. While the import of foreign cultural products has been prohibited, there has been some limited liberal-
ization following the WTO accession, notably in the distribution of printed matters and audiovisual products. See China’s 
Services Schedule 2D, 4A–4E.
101 Except for a few media outlets directly controlled by the Party, Chinese media enterprises must fi nance them-
selves mostly through subscriptions and advertisement. See Sigrun Abels, ‘State vs. Market: Media in Transition’, International 
Institute for Asian Studies News Letter, no. 37 (2005).
102 The publishers are subject to the editorial responsibility system. See State Council, Regulation on the Admin-
istration of Publishing Industry (Order 343, 25 Dec. 2001), Art. 25; State Council, Regulation on the Administration of 
Audiovisual Products (Order 341, 25 Dec. 2001), Art. 16. In addition, with respect to audiovisual products, the import-
ers must submit all planned imports to the Ministry of Culture for advance content review. Id., art. 11. See also, Carin 
Zissis & Preeti Bhattacharji, Media Censorship in China, 18 Mar. 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, <www.cfr.org/
publication/11515/>.
103 The criteria are tightened and loosened from time to time to balance the need for control and the need to allow 
freer fl ow of information in the society. See Zissis & Bhattacharji, id.; Abels, supra n. 101.
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small number of SOEs whose management personnel are appointed and controlled by 
the government, the Chinese authorities are able to implement censorship policies in a 
highly fl exible and non-transparent manner, which arguably has made censorship more 
effective and cost-effi cient. While the ownership restriction is clearly anti-competitive – 
a small number of SOEs are guaranteed monopoly profi ts in the cultural industry – it is 
motivated by political rather than economic considerations.
The same political consideration helps explain the policy of maintaining state import 
monopolies in foreign cultural products. The political nature of the policy can be further 
observed by the absence of normal trade barriers for cultural products. China imposes 
no tariff or quota on the import of foreign books, magazines, other printed matters, or 
audiovisual products.104 And there is no evidence of monopolistic price ‘markup’ in the 
domestic sales of such products.105 Although in theory the authorized SOEs may restrict 
the quantity of imports at will, under the current Chinese system they have incentives 
to import more rather than less so as to make greater profi ts. 
In light of the political nature of the policy, it seems curious that China failed to 
include cultural products in the Protocol list of products reserved for state trading. One 
plausible explanation is that the Chinese government had considered cultural products 
of suffi ciently a political character that it would not be necessary to include them in the 
reserve list, just as it would not be necessary to include weaponry and military equip-
ment in the list. Apparently, the issue of trading in cultural products was never discussed 
in the accession negotiations.106
2.2.2.2. Major interpretive issues
The central issue here is whether China has the right to maintain exclusive state trading 
in the import of cultural products, even though such products are not expressly reserved 
for state trading under the Protocol. Section 5.1 of the Protocol, which sets out the 
principal commitment on trading rights, provides the following:
Without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement, 
China shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so that, within 
three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods 
throughout the customs territory of China, except for those goods listed in Annex 2A which 
continue to be subject to state trading in accordance with this Protocol. Such right to trade shall 
be the right to import and export goods. (emphasis added)
China submitted that its restrictions on trading rights are within its ‘right to regulate 
trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’, because they are necessary 
104 See China’s Goods Sch. CLII, Annex 8 of the Protocol. 
105 Such price markup by state import monopolies is prohibited by GATT Art. II:4.
106 There is no mention of this matter in the Protocol or the Working Party Report. In the WTO dispute proceed-
ings, the United States did not indicate that there was any understanding on the issue during the accession negotiation.
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to protect public morals, consistent with GATT Article XX(a).107 The fi rst interpretive 
question, therefore, is whether the policy exceptions contained in GATT Article XX are 
available as affi rmative defense for the Protocol obligations.
The United States argued that ‘China’s right to regulate trade’ under the fi rst clause 
of section 5.1 applies only to measures regulating goods that are traded, such as import 
licensing, TBT and SPS requirements, and not to measures regulating whole categories of 
traders engaged in the importation of goods.108 Textually, the US argument makes sense. 
Since the WTO agreements do not regulate the extent of state trading activities – it is 
in this sense that the trading rights commitment is ‘WTO-plus’ – one cannot determine 
logically whether China’s maintaining of state trading in the cultural sector is consistent 
with the WTO Agreement by merely examining the texts of WTO provisions. To answer 
the question of whether GATT exceptions are available to the Protocol provisions, one 
needs to defi ne the relationship between the GATT and the Protocol at a systemic level – 
the very interpretive challenge facing the WTO adjudicatory body discussed above. 
Recognizing the issue is of ‘broad systemic import’, the United States suggested that 
it is not necessary for the Panel to deal with the issue in order to resolve this dispute.109 
According to the United States, China’s measures fall considerably short of the standards 
of Article XX, and therefore the Panel can simply apply Article XX in this case on an 
arguendo basis and conclude in its favour. To support this approach, the United States 
cited the Appellate Body decision in US–Shrimp Bonding, in which the Appellate Body 
took this approach to avoid deciding the issue of whether GATT Article XX is avail-
able to justify a measure found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.110 
Indeed, applying GATT Article XX on an arguendo basis may prove an effective issue-
avoidance technique in this case. But the technique is only useful and will only be used 
when the treaty interpreter believes the Article XX defense should fail. Hence, there is a 
limit on how far the technique can help the WTO adjudicators to avoid addressing the 
systemic issue altogether.
Once the Panel decides to apply GATT Article XX, on an arguendo basis or other-
wise, it will fi nd itself in a familiar territory since there already exists a substantial body of 
Article XX jurisprudence. The challenge then becomes how to balance the political inter-
est of China with the trade interests of other Members in the application of Article XX. 
The balance can be drawn at each step of the Article XX analysis.
107 See China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Enter-
tainment Products (WT/DS363), Second Submission of the United States of America, 29 Aug. 2008, para. 39, available at: 
<www.ustr.gov>. China has not made its submissions public.
108 Id., para. 40. The United States also pointed out that para. 84(b) of the Working Party Report contains the 
following qualifi cation for the trading rights commitment: ‘[f]oreign enterprises and individuals with trading rights had 
to comply with all WTO-consistent requirements related to importing and exporting, such as those concerning import 
licensing, TBT and SPS’.
109 China – Measures affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products (WT/DS363), Answers of the United States of America to the First Set of Questions by the Panel to the 
Parties (11 Aug. 2008), para. 60, available at: <www.ustr.gov>.
110 Id., para. 61 (citing United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand (DS343), United States – Customs 
Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Antidumping/Countervailing Duties (DS345), WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R, 
adopted 1 Aug. 2008, paras 304–319).
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The only defense China invoked is GATT Article XX(a), which exempts measures 
‘necessary to protect public morals’. Although Article XX(a) has never been interpreted in 
previous GATT disputes, a similar provision in GATS Article XIV(a) has been interpreted by 
the Panel and the Appellate Body in US–Gambling.111 To meet the standards of Article XX(a), 
China has to show that its measures are designed to protect ‘public morals’ and are 
 ‘necessary’ to protect public morals. Furthermore, it has to demonstrate that the measures 
do not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination’ or ‘disguised restriction on 
international trade’ within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX.
While there are interpretive questions as to whether China’s measures are designed 
to protect public morals,112 the key issue in this case lies in the interpretation of the 
‘necessary’ standard. Under Article XX jurisprudence, interpreting ‘necessity’ involves a 
process of ‘weighing and balancing’ several factors: the relative importance of the interests 
to be furthered, the contribution of the measure to the realization of its objective, and 
the restrictive impact of the measure on trade. The question of necessity hinges ulti-
mately on whether there is a WTO-consistent alternative that is reasonably available to 
achieve the policy objective of the measure.113 According to the United States, China has 
numerous alternatives to achieve its censorship objectives that do not restrict the right 
to import. It suggested that China could allow foreign entities to conduct the content 
reviews themselves after developing the relevant expertise or to hire domestic Chinese 
entities with the appropriate expertise to do so.114 In deciding whether these suggested 
alternatives are ‘reasonably available’, the Panel needs to evaluate whether they could 
achieve the same level of control desired by the Chinese government.115
If China’s measures are found to be necessary to protect public morals, they will be 
further examined under the chapeau of Article XX, which requires that such measures be 
‘not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi able dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade’. The main issue under the chapeau is to defi ne arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination. Since all the entities authorized to import cultural  products 
111 The exception of GATS XIV(a) is broader in scope than GATT XX(a) as it exempts measures ‘necessary to 
protect public morals or to maintain public order’. China did not invoke GATS XIV since s. 5.1 defi nes the right to trade 
as ‘the right to import and export goods’.
112 The term ‘public morals’ was defi ned as denoting ‘standards of right and wrong of conduct maintained by or 
on behalf of a community or nation’. Panel Report, US–Gambling, para. 6.465. Some have suggested that accepting the 
censorship policy of the Chinese government as meeting the WTO standard of public morals would be more damaging to 
the reputation of WTO panels than the accusations that they kill turtles and dolphins or legitimize gambling. See Henry 
Gao, ‘The Mighty Pen, the Almighty Dollar, and the Holly Hammer and Sickle: An Examination of the Confl ict between 
Trade Liberalization and Domestic Cultural Policy with Special Regard to the Recent Dispute between the United States 
and China on Restrictions of Certain Cultural Products’, Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 2, 
no. 2 (2007):313–344.
113 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161, 169/
AB/R, adopted 10 Jan. 2001, paras 162–166; Appellate Body Report, US–Gambling, paras 305–308.
114 Answers to Panel questions, supra n. 109, para. 62.
115 An alternative is not considered ‘reasonably available’ if it is merely theoretical in nature or imposes an undue 
burden on the responding Member, such as prohibitive costs and substantial technical diffi culties. And such an  alternative 
must be capable of achieving the level of protection desired by the responding Member. Appellate Body Report, 
‘US–Gambling’, para. 308.
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are Chinese SOEs, the discriminatory effect of the measures may seem  obvious.116 How-
ever, given the fact that all Chinese private enterprises (and most Chinese SOEs for 
that matter) are also denied the right to import cultural products, can the measures be 
viewed as discriminating between China and other Members ‘where the same condi-
tions prevail’? In fact, when the right to import is reserved exclusively to a small number 
of SOEs, the measure is in essence one of state import monopoly which, by defi nition, 
excludes competition from all other importers, domestic or foreign. Hence, how to defi ne 
‘discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’ can be the key to 
the chapeau interpretation.117
2.2.2.3. Summary comment
What the WTO adjudicatory body encounters in this case are measures taken by the 
Chinese government for the purpose of keeping political control over its citizens. In 
maintaining exclusive state trading and import monopoly in foreign cultural products, 
the Chinese authorities can rely on the personnel of selected SOEs to police the imports. 
In other words, the Party can trust the personnel of selected SOEs in a way it cannot 
with private entities to carry out its opaque and capricious censorship policies. It is for 
this reason that I believe that China has never intended to liberalize trading rights in 
foreign cultural products and that the failure to explicitly exclude these products from 
the trading rights commitment was a major oversight on the part of China in the acces-
sion negotiations. While a partial reform of the system is possible (e.g., to allow private 
entities to import certain categories of products that are not politically sensitive, such 
as science and technology publications), complete liberalization of trading rights in the 
cultural sector is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future no matter how this case is 
decided. In the event China loses, it may just accept the consequences of noncompliance, 
which would be an outcome similar to that of US–Gambling.118 The ultimate challenge 
for the WTO adjudicatory body, therefore, is to determine where the boundary should 
be drawn between the jurisdictions of the WTO and China on regulating domestic 
measures of such political nature.
116 The United States also claimed that China’s measures are inconsistent with s. 5.2 of the Protocol which provides: 
‘Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, all foreign individuals and enterprises, including those not invested or 
registered in China, shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to enterprises in China with respect 
to the right to trade.’ If China is found to have violated s. 5.2, the question will still arise as to whether such violation can 
be excused by Art. XX.
117 What constitutes ‘the same conditions prevail’ under the chapeau is not well developed in WTO jurisprudence. 
See Julia Ya Qin, ‘Defi ning Non-Discrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization’, Boston University Interna-
tional Law Journal 23, no. 2 (2005): 215–297.
118 See supra n. 65. Unlike in US–Gambling, however, China would not be able to withdraw or amend its trading 
rights commitment easily. See supra Part I.B.2.
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2.2.3. China – Financial Information Services (the Xinhua case)
This case was initiated by the European Communities and the United States in March 
2008 and joined by Canada in June 2008.119 The complainants claimed that certain 
measures taken by the Xinhua News Agency, the State news agency of China, violated 
China’s specifi c commitments on fi nancial services under the GATS and its Protocol 
commitment to maintain regulatory independence in the service sectors. The dispute 
was settled in November 2008.120 Despite the settlement, it remains instructive to look at 
some of the interpretive issues relating to the WTO-plus provision involved in the case.
2.2.3.1. Background
The Xinhua News Agency is the offi cial news agency of the Chinese government.121 
In addition, it was vested with regulatory powers, including the authority to regulate 
activities of foreign news organizations in China.122 Although foreign news agencies 
are generally prohibited from establishing business operations in China, an exception 
was made in 1996 to allow them to distribute economic and fi nancial news directly 
to Chinese clients.123 This policy, however, was abruptly reversed in September 2006 
when Xinhua issued a decision requiring all foreign news organizations to use an agent 
designated by Xinhua to sell information in China.124 The 2006 decision drew strong 
criticism from major media companies, including Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones, 
which considered the move as a maneuver by Xinhua to grab the fast growing business 
of fi nancial information supply in China.125 Then in June 2007, Xinhua launched its own 
fi nancial information service, ‘Xinhua 08’, that aimed to compete with foreign fi nancial 
information services.126 
The complainants in this case made three major claims. First, they claimed that China 
made specifi c commitments on the provision of fi nancial information in its GATS Sched-
ule, and therefore the 2006 decision violated China’s obligations under GATS. Second, 
they contended that the reversal of the previous policy was inconsistent with China’s 
119 China–Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS372, WT/
DS373, WT/DS378.
120 See Memorandum of Understanding regarding Measures Affecting Foreign Suppliers of Financial Information 
Services (MOU) reached between China and the EC, the United States, and Canada, respectively, WT/DS372/4, WT/
DS373/4, WT/DS378/4 (9 Dec. 2008).
121 Xinhua serves as the largest information centre in China. It has more than 100 bureaus worldwide, owns and 
publishes more than 20 newspapers and journals, and prints in six foreign languages. See Brief Introduction to the Xinhua 
News Agency, <www.xinhuanet.com/xhsjj/pic1.htm>.
122 State Council, Decision on Establishing Administrative Permission for the Administrative Examination and 
Approval of Items that must be Retained (Order no. 412, 29 Jun. 2004).
123 See State Council’s Notice Authorizing Xinhua News Agency to Implement Centralized Administration over 
the Release of Economic Information in the People’s Republic of China by Foreign News Agencies and their Subsidiary 
Information Institutions (31 Dec. 1995, issued as Circular no.1 of 1996).
124 ‘Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News Agencies’, Xinhua 
News Agency, 10 Sep. 2006.
125 See ‘China’s Media Curbs Aim to Bolster Xinhua: Beijing Hopes to Create a Global News Competitor; Plan 
Draws Criticism from U.S., EU’, Wall Street Journal, 13 Sep. 2006, A8.
126 Xinhua launched a comprehensive fi nancial information services system, available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/
fortune/2007-06/20/content_6269035.htm>.
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‘standstill’ obligation contained in the horizontal section of its GATS Schedule, which 
requires China not to make the conditions for existing foreign service suppliers more 
restrictive than they existed as of the date of accession. Third, the complaints alleged that 
China breached its Protocol commitment to maintain regulatory independence in the 
service sectors covered by its GSTS Schedule, because Xinhua, the regulatory authority 
for fi nancial information services, also participated in the supply of such services through 
Xinhua 08, which competes with foreign service suppliers.
The Protocol commitment at issue is set out in paragraph 309 of the Working Party 
Report, which was incorporated into the Protocol. Paragraph 309 reads:
Some members of the Working Party also expressed concern about maintaining the independence 
of regulators from those they regulated. China confi rmed that for the services included in China’s 
Schedule of Specifi c Commitments, relevant regulatory authorities would be separate from, and not account-
able to, any service suppliers they regulated, except for courier and railway transportation services. For these 
excepted sectors, China would comply with other relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement and 
the Draft Protocol. The Working Party took note of these commitments.
This commitment is a WTO-plus (or ‘GATS-plus’) obligation in that no such require-
ment exists under GATS. The closest GATS obligation may be found in Article VI 
Domestic Regulation, which requires each Member to ‘ensure that all measures of general 
application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and 
impartial manner’.127 Although an ‘objective and impartial’ administration can be better 
achieved through formal regulatory independence, GATS stops short of requiring formal 
separation of regulatory authorities from service suppliers they regulate.128 As indicated 
in paragraph 309, China made this special commitment in response to the particular 
concerns of some Members on the issue of regulatory independence in China.
2.2.3.2. Interpretive issues concerning paragraph 309
Since paragraph 309 applies only to services included in China’s GATS Schedule, a 
threshold issue in this case would be to determine whether China has made a spe-
cifi c commitment on fi nancial information services. The complainants cited section 7B 
Banking and other fi nancial services, subsection (k), of China’s Schedule, which states: 
‘Provision and transfer of fi nancial information, and fi nancial data processing and related 
software by supplier of other fi nancial services.’129 China contended that section 7(B)(k) 
127 GATS Art. VI:1.
128 Similarly, GATS requires each Member to provide judicial or administrative reviews of administrative decisions 
affecting services, but stops short of requiring such review procedures to be formally independent of the agency rendering 
the administrative decisions. Instead, it provides that ‘[w]here such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted 
with the administrative decision concerned, the Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide for an objective 
and impartial review’. And this provision ‘shall not be construed to require a Member to institute such tribunals or proce-
dures where this would be inconsistent with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system’. GATS Article VI:2. 
The soft requirement of GATS contrasts with the corresponding provision of GATT Article X:3, which states unequivo-
cally that the judicial or administrative review tribunals or procedures ‘shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with 
administrative enforcement…’.
129 Regarding this item, under both ‘market access’ and ‘national treatment’, the Schedule shows no limitation for 
modes 1, 2 and 3, and ‘unbound except as indicated in horizontal commitments’ for Mode 4. The column of ‘market access’ 
contains a note on mode 3: ‘Criteria for authorization to deal in China’s fi nancial services sector are solely prudential 
(i.e., contain no economic needs test or quantitative limits on licenses). Branches of foreign institutions are permitted’.
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was not intended to cover services provided by foreign news agencies and that it made 
no commitment to open up its market for news services.130 As US–Gambling dem-
onstrates, interpreting a Member’s services schedule can be exceedingly complex and 
controversial.131
In comparison, the textual interpretation of paragraph 309 should be relatively 
straightforward. Given Xinhua’s control of Xinhua 08, it would not be diffi cult to fi nd 
that the Chinese regulatory authority in fi nancial information services was not ‘separate 
from’ the service supplier it regulated.
A more diffi cult question in this case would involve the interpretation of the 
relationship between paragraph 309 and the GATS provisions. Specifi cally, should the 
GATS-plus commitment be entitled to the defense of the general exceptions under 
GATS Article XIV? For instance, could China avail itself of GATS Article XIV(a), which 
excuses measures ‘necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order’?132 
The interpretive issues in this context would be similar to those raised in the Trading 
Rights case regarding the availability of GATT Article XX. Compared to the trading 
rights commitments, however, the regulatory independence commitment has a narrower 
and more precisely defi ned relationship with the WTO Agreement: it applies to China’s 
GATS Schedule exclusively. This more defi ned relationship might suggest that paragraph 
309 should be interpreted completely within the context of GATS, including all the 
applicable GATS exceptions. On the other hand, unlike section 5.1 of the Protocol 
which provides the trading rights commitment with the condition that such commit-
ment is ‘without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent 
with the WTO Agreement’, paragraph 309 does not contain any qualifying language 
for the regulatory independence commitment. Textually interpreted, the absence of any 
qualifying language in paragraph 309 may suggest that China’s commitment is uncon-
ditional and hence not entitled to any defense based on GATS Article XIV.133 But does 
such a conclusion make policy sense in light of the fact that the Article XIV exceptions 
are available to the less stringent obligation under GATS Article VI (administration of 
domestic regulation in an objective and impartial manner)?
2.2.3.3. The settlement outcome
China settled this dispute through consultations instead of going to the panel procedure. 
In the settlement agreements, China agreed to repeal the 2006 decision and to authorize 
a new regulator that would be ‘separate from, and not accountable to’ any suppliers of 
130 The Industry Catalogue has consistently listed the news industry in the ‘Prohibited’ category for foreign direct 
investment. See text at supra n. 100.
131 Although China’s Schedule was negotiated in the accession context, rather than during the multilateral GATS 
negotiations, the interpretive approach would not be different given that China’s Schedule has become one of the annexes 
to GATS. See Part II, para. 1, of the Protocol.
132 A footnote to paragraph (a) states: ‘The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and suf-
fi ciently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.’
133 The Appellate Body has said that ‘omission must have some meaning’. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcohol Beverages, WT/DS8, 10, 11/AB/R (4 Oct. 1996), 18.
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fi nancial information services. Moreover, it agreed to allow foreign suppliers of fi nancial 
information to establish local operations in China – a breakthrough in its long-standing 
policy of prohibiting foreign investment in news services, although the agreements care-
fully defi ned ‘fi nancial information services’ as distinct from ‘news agency services’.134 
Subsequently, China replaced Xinhua with the State Council News Offi ce (SCNO) as 
the regulator for fi nancial information services. Under the new rules jointly issued by 
SCNO and other government agencies, effective 1 June 2009, foreign institutions may 
provide fi nancial information to Chinese clients directly and may also establish local 
operations to do so; but they may not engage in news-gathering activities or operate as 
news agencies in China.135
Thus, the outcome of this case appears to be a complete victory for the complain-
ants. Despite all the legal uncertainties involved, China has accepted full responsibility 
under GATS and made signifi cant institutional changes to fulfi l that responsibility. Mean-
while, it has strictly limited the concessions to the ‘provision of fi nancial information’, 
just as provided in its Services Schedule, so as to ensure that its control over the supply 
of information in all other areas will remain intact.
2.2.4. China–Exportation of Raw Materials
The latest WTO disputes fi led against China involve its WTO-plus commitments on 
export taxes. In June 2009, the United States and the EC requested WTO consultations 
with China regarding China’s constraints on the export of various raw materials, includ-
ing bauxite, coke, fl uorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus 
and zinc.136 Their requests allege that China has imposed tariff and nontariff restrictions 
on the export of these materials in violation of a number of GATT and Protocol pro-
visions.137
2.2.4.1. Background
China’s principal commitment regarding export taxes is set out in section 11.3 of the 
Protocol, which provides:
134 See MOU, supra n. 120, para. 5 (stating that ‘[F]inancial information services are distinct from “news agency 
services” as defi ned in UN Provisional Central Product Classifi cation (1991) group 962.’) It is interesting to  contemplate 
whether the MOU would constitute ‘subsequent agreement’ regarding the interpretation of the Protocol under 
Art. 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, although the MOU declares that it is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the 
 parties under the WTO Agreement.
135 See State Council Information Offi ce, Ministry of Commerce and the State Administration of Industry & Com-
merce, The Rules on the Administration of Provision of Financial Information Services by Foreign Institutions in China (30 Apr. 
2009), Art. 19.
136 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/1 (25 Jun. 2009) (US); WT/
DS395/1 (25 Jun. 2009) (EC).
137 The alleged violations are that of GATT Arts VIII, X and XI, paras 5.1, 5.2, 8.2 and 11.3 of the Protocol, and 
paras 83, 84, 162 and 165 of the Working Party Report. Id.
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China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifi cally provided for in 
Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the 
GATT 1994.
Annex 6 of the Protocol, Products Subject to Export Duty, contains a list of 84 prod-
ucts, most of which are minerals or other raw materials. The export duty rates on these 
products range from 20% to 40%, with the exception of tin ores and concentrates which 
are subject to a rate of 50%. The Note to Annex 6 states:
China confi rmed that the tariff levels included in this Annex are maximum levels which will 
not be exceeded. China confi rmed furthermore that it would not increase the presently applied 
rates, except under exceptional circumstances. If such circumstances occurred, China would con-
sult with affected members prior to increasing applied tariffs with a view to fi nding a mutually 
acceptable solution.
In short, China made three commitments regarding export taxes. First, it will eliminate 
customs duties on all exports other than the 84 products listed in Annex 6. Second, the 
statutory rates for the 84 products will be bound at the level set out in Annex 6. Third, 
the applied rates for the 84 products will not increase except under exceptional circum-
stances and only after prior consultations with affected Members.
These commitments are ‘WTO-plus’ because the WTO imposes no discipline 
on the elimination or reduction of export tariffs.138 While quantitative restrictions on 
exports are prohibited under GATT Article XI, a Member can effectively circumvent 
such prohibition by charging taxes on the exports.139 Considering the general lack of 
WTO disciplines on export taxes, China’s commitments are nothing short of remark-
able. It is unclear what motivated China to accept such obligations. It seems obvious, 
however, that these commitments were not taken for systemic reasons and instead are 
purely commercial in nature.
Unfortunately, China has not lived up to its promises. Since joining the WTO, 
China has levied export taxes on many products outside the list of Annex 6. According 
to the WTO Trade Policy Review report, in 2007 China imposed statutory export taxes 
on 88 tariff lines and interim export duties to an additional 110 lines that had not been 
subject to statutory export taxes.140 The products subject to such duties included mineral 
products, chemical products, iron and steel products, and grain and other agricultural 
products. And many such duties were levied in addition to export quotas and licenses. 
138 Although the GATT contracting parties recognized that export tariffs could constitute serious obstacles to trade 
and contemplated negotiations to reduce export tariffs, see GATT Art. XXVIII bis, no such negotiation was conducted. The 
existing GATT rules on export tariffs are limited to the MFN requirement of Art. I and to the requirements on customs 
fees and formalities under Art. VIII.
139 The lack of effective GATT disciplines on exports can be partially explained by the historical context in which 
the major industrial countries ‘could reasonably assume that no impediment would ever be placed to their free access to 
other people’s resources’. Statement of the Representative of Canada on 22 Feb. 1977, GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/6 (10 
Mar. 1977), 1. Credit is due to Lorand Bartels for pointing to this source. For a general discussion on the lack of effec-
tive GATT disciplines on exports and its historical context, see Melaku Geboye Desta, ‘The Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, the World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements’, Journal of World Trade 37, no. 3 (2003): 
523–551.
140 ‘WTO Trade Policy Review on China’, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S199/Rev.1 (12 Aug. 2008), 
para. 112.
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Moreover, China has raised both statutory and applied taxes on some of the products 
listed in Annex 6. For example, in May 2008, the export duties on natural phosphates (not 
on the list of Annex 6) and yellow phosphorus (on the list of Annex 6 but subject to a 
rate cap of 20%) increased from 10% to 20% to 110% to 120%.141 Apparently, China never 
conducted prior consultations with affected Members as required by the Protocol.
The United States, the EC and Japan have been most vocal about China’s failure 
to honour its commitments. In recent years, they repeatedly raised the issue during 
the annual transitional reviews of China’s WTO compliance.142 They claim that China’s 
export restrictions have caused sharp rises in world prices on the one hand and declines 
in domestic prices on the other, giving China’s downstream producers a signifi cant com-
petitive advantage over foreign producers. China, on the other hand, has defended its 
export restrictions on the grounds of environmental protection and conservation of 
natural resources. According to China, export restrictions are imposed on products that 
are highly energy consuming and polluting, or consuming large amounts of raw mate-
rials. China asserts that, like other WTO members, it has the right to invoke GATT 
Article XX to implement necessary export restrictions on exhaustible natural resources 
and that its export taxes were levied on a temporary basis in a manner consistent with 
WTO rules.143
2.2.4.2. Major interpretive issues
Once again, the major interpretive issue in this case lies in the availability of GATT 
exceptions, including those under Articles XI and XX, to the Protocol obligations. As 
noted, China has defended its export taxes under GATT Article XX(g), which excuses 
measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion. Furthermore, China has claimed that its export taxes are levied on a temporary basis 
in a manner consistent with WTO rules. Apparently, China was referring to the provision 
of GATT Article XI:2(a), which provides that the obligation to eliminate quantitative 
restrictions under Article XI:1 does not extend to ‘[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products 
essential to the exporting contracting party’.
But what is the textual basis of applying the exceptions of GATT Articles XI and XX 
to China’s commitments in section 11.3 and Annex 6 of the Protocol? Under  section 11.3 
141 In 2008, China also levied 100% export taxes on 32 products in April, and 150% export taxes on fertilizers in 
September. See infra n. 142, ‘Questions from Japan to China’, G/C/W/606; ‘Questions from the United States to China’, 
G/C/W/603.
142 See WTO Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to para. 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China, ‘Questions from the United States to China’, G/C/W/589 (16 Nov. 2007) and G/C/W/603 (24 Oct. 
2008); ‘Questions from the European Communities to China’, G/C/W/605 (4 Nov. 2008); ‘Questions from Japan to 
China’, G/C/W/568 (2 Nov. 2007) and G/C/W/606 (10 Nov. 2008).
143 See WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Minutes of Meeting 21 and 23 May 2008, ‘Trade Policy Review on 
China’, WT/TPR/M/199/Add.1 (28 Aug. 2008), China’s answer to Japan Question 11, 216; China’s answer to EC Ques-
tions 63–64, 331.
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of the Protocol, China’s obligation to eliminate export taxes is subject to the exception 
of charges ‘applied in conformity with GATT Article VIII’. GATT Article VIII concerns 
the imposition of fees and charges other than import or export duties.144 This specifi c 
mention of GATT Article VIII in section 11.3 can be construed to mean that the parties 
intended to exclude all other GATT provisions from being applicable (expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius).
Despite the lack of a textual basis to link the GATT exceptions to China’s commit-
ments on export taxes, it would not make sense to deny China the right to invoke these 
exceptions from a systemic point of view. After all, export tariffs are merely one form of 
export restrictions. If export quotas and licenses can be justifi ed under GATT Articles 
XI:2(a) and XX, what would be the policy reason for disallowing the same justifi cations 
for export tariffs? If anything, export tariffs should be preferable to export quotas due 
to their inherent transparency, just as import tariffs are preferred to import quotas under 
the WTO system. However, without a textual basis, the panels and the Appellate Body 
would be hard pressed to fi nd the availability of the GATT exceptions to China’s com-
mitments on export taxes, unless the potential complainants in this dispute could agree 
otherwise.
It should be noted that the systemic issue raised in this context would not be fully 
resolved within the dispute settlement process. Suppose China is found to have violated 
its commitments on export taxes, can it then seek to withdraw such commitments or 
modify them by expanding the list of products or raising the rates set out in Annex 6? 
Unlike in the case of import tariffs, in which the WTO Member may seek to modify or 
withdraw its scheduled concessions on a regular basis in accordance with GATT Article 
XXVIII (Modifi cation of Schedules), there is no similar mechanism under GATT with 
respect to export tariffs. As a result, China would have to seek to revise its commitments 
through a formal amendment to the Protocol. As previously discussed, the legal mecha-
nism for making such amendment remains unclear.145
3. A Proposal for Three Working Principles
The interpretive issues presented by the Protocol are of broad systemic import that 
requires a systemic response. In the absence of ‘legislative’ guidance, it is now up to the 
WTO adjudicatory body to take up the challenge. To meet that challenge, panels and 
the Appellate Body will need to embrace a more holistic and fl exible approach than the 
one prevailing. While it might be prudent to address each specifi c issue on the narrowest 
ground possible and on a case-by-case basis, it will take a broad systemic view of the 
fi eld to produce a body of Protocol jurisprudence that can provide the level of ‘security 
and predictability’ desired by the WTO system.146 
144 GATT Art. VIII:1.
145 See Part 1.2.2.
146 DSU Art. 3.2.
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Interpretation of the Protocol provisions, of course, must follow the interpretive 
principles codifi ed in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. The VCLT articles are however 
treaty provisions themselves; and as such, their application is more of an art than a scien-
tifi c process.147 In practicing that art, a treaty interpreter needs more tools and skills to 
achieve a desired result. While the VCLT provides ‘an essential infrastructure’ for inter-
pretation, applying its rules in particular circumstances ‘requires skills and techniques 
which go well beyond their brief prescriptions’.148
In light of this understanding, this part of the paper proposes three working prin-
ciples for interpreting the WTO-plus provisions of the Protocol: (i) identifying the base-
line of a particular WTO-plus obligation; (ii) distinguishing systemic commitments from 
commercial commitments; and (iii) giving due consideration to China’s intention. These 
principles are formulated based on the observation that there are common interpretive 
issues presented by the WTO-plus provisions and that such issues can (and should) be 
dealt with in a systematic manner. It is hoped that these working principles will serve as 
useful tools in applying the VCLT in the particular circumstances of the Protocol so as 
to achieve a ‘correct’ result of interpretation.
3.1. Identifying the baseline
A WTO-plus obligation is by defi nition a more stringent obligation than what is pre-
scribed by the WTO multilateral agreements. What is prescribed by the WTO multilat-
eral agreements, therefore, provides a baseline for the WTO-plus obligation.149 Depend-
ing on the particular WTO-plus obligation, its baseline may be one or more provisions 
contained in a single WTO agreement or multiple provisions across several WTO agree-
ments. The relationship between a WTO-plus provision and its baseline provision(s) may 
be fairly close and clear, or somewhat vague and distant. For example, the baseline for 
the special transparency obligations of China can be easily found in the various WTO 
provisions regarding transparency, such as GATT Article X, GATS Article III, and TRIPS 
Article 63. By contrast, the baseline for China’s obligations on foreign investment is more 
distant and less clear, because these obligations are much broader in scope than the lim-
ited investment rules contained in TRIMS or the specifi c commitments under mode 3 of 
GATS schedules. In addition, some WTO-plus obligations may not have any correspond-
ing provision in the WTO agreements, a prime example of which is the obligation to let 
147 See Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5, 7 (expressing 
the view that interpretation is ‘an art’, and that the Vienna rules ‘are not a set of simple precepts that can be applied to 
produce a scientifi cally verifi able result. More guidance is needed to set the ground for a “correct result”, or at least one 
which has been correctly ascertained’).
148 Id., 6. Furthermore, Gardiner observed that the Vienna rules ‘are not an exclusive compilation of guidance on 
treaty interpretation, other skills and principles that are used to achieve a reasoned interpretation remaining admissible to 
the extent not in confl ict with the Vienna rules’. Id.
149 The concept of ‘baseline’ for defi ning WTO-plus and minus rules was introduced by Charnovitz, supra n. 2, 15–16 
(defi ning a baseline as ‘the body of obligations that would otherwise automatically devolve upon any applicant when it 
joins the WTO’).
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market prices determine all prices in China. In that case, the baseline can be defi ned as 
the absence of any discipline in the WTO.
What is the use of identifying the baseline for the WTO-plus obligations? First of all, 
locating the baseline can help the treaty interpreter to ascertain the rationale or purpose 
of a particular WTO-plus obligation. Apparently, some WTO-plus rules were enacted 
because the generally applicable WTO rules were perceived as inadequate or insuffi cient 
in dealing with the systemic conditions in China, and special and more stringent rules 
were deemed necessary to ensure the effectiveness of WTO disciplines. The various obli-
gations of China concerning market economy practices and domestic governance appear 
to fall into this category. Other special obligations, such as those concerning foreign 
direct investment and export tariffs, do not appear, however, to have a bearing on the 
existing WTO disciplines; rather, they are China’s commitments to unilaterally expand 
the liberalization of trade and investment. By locating the baseline rules, the treaty inter-
preter can more readily ascertain the raison d’etre of a particular WTO-plus obligation, 
which in turn may help him to determine the proper boundary of such obligation.
Moreover, identifying the baseline can help to defi ne the context of the Protocol 
provisions. The Appellate Body has long regarded as its duty to ‘read all applicable provi-
sions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously’. 150 Legally, 
the baseline rules are part of such ‘applicable provisions’ to China since they are not 
replaced, but rather are strengthened, by the WTO-plus provisions. Indeed, the baseline 
rules should be viewed as the relevant and useful context of the WTO-plus provisions. 
The object and purpose of the baseline rules can shed light on that of the WTO-plus 
provisions. Drawing from existing jurisprudence on the baseline rules, the treaty inter-
preter would be able to construe the Protocol provisions consistently and coherently 
with the provisions of the WTO multilateral agreements.
More specifi cally, identifying the baseline can help to determine which exceptions 
of the WTO agreements should be made available to the Protocol provisions. As a matter 
of principle, no WTO obligation is absolute – there is no jus cogens codifi ed by WTO 
law – and even the most fundamental obligations of the WTO are subject to various 
policy exceptions.151 Accordingly, the silence of the Protocol about exceptions does not 
mean that no exception should apply to its rules. Rather, it is a matter of determining 
which exceptions of the WTO agreements should apply. In general, if an exception is 
available to the baseline rule, then it should also be made available to the more stringent 
WTO-plus rule, unless applying such exception will render the WTO-plus provision 
meaningless.152 In other words, if we recognize the baseline provisions as part of the 
150 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy Safeguard, supra n. 59, para. 81 (quoting its own report in Argentina – 
Safeuard Measures on Imports of Footwear) (emphasis original).
151 For example, the general MFN obligation under GATT Art. I:1 is subject to the exceptions contained in 
Arts XX, XXI, XXIV and XXV, and the Enabling Clause.
152 The case for making the exceptions of the WTO agreements generally available to the Protocol can also be made 
from a reserve perspective: although the Protocol is generally silent about whether China must implement its Protocol 
obligations on an MFN basis, few would doubt the applicability of the MFN principle to all such obligations.
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context for a WTO-plus obligation, then we should also recognize all the exceptions 
available to that baseline as part of the broader context for such obligation.
Take as an example China’s obligation on export tariffs. Since the only major WTO 
discipline on export is the requirement of GATT Article XI:1 to eliminate quantita-
tive export restrictions,153 Article XI:1 provides a baseline for the special obligation of 
China. The purpose of the Article XI:1 provision can inform the rationale and purpose 
of China’s obligation (liberalization of exports). And the exceptions available to the 
Article XI:1 obligation – including the exception set out in Article XI:2(a) (restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent critical shortages of products essential to the exporting 
Member) and the general exceptions in Article XX – should also be made available to 
the Protocol obligation on export tariffs.
Applying the baseline principle in the Trading Rights case is a little more compli-
cated. As previously discussed, the WTO system does not restrict the extent and scope of 
state trading activities, and it is in this sense the trading rights commitment is WTO-plus. 
Nonetheless, the system has long recognized that state trading enterprises might be oper-
ated ‘to create serious obstacles to trade’154 and has imposed certain disciplines on state 
trading activities. Specifi cally, GATT Article XVII (State Trading Enterprises) requires a 
state trading enterprise to act in a non-discriminatory manner, which is understood to 
require such enterprise to act ‘solely in accordance with commercial considerations’.155 
The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that Members do not use state trad-
ing enterprises to escape or circumvent their GATT obligations.156 In addition, GATT 
Article II:4 prohibits state-authorized import monopolies from marking up the prices of 
imports such so as to evade the tariff bindings set out in the Member’s goods schedule.157 
Due to the inherent lack of transparency in state trading operations, however, these 
GATT disciplines may not be easily enforced.158 It is these GATT disciplines, along with 
the concerns over their effectiveness that informs the basic rationale of China’s trading 
rights obligation: general liberalization of trading rights is needed because the extensive 
state trading and import monopolies practiced in China could create massive nontariff 
barriers that cannot be adequately addressed by the existing GATT disciplines.
The GATT provisions on state trading and import monopolies, therefore, provide 
the baseline for the trading rights obligation of China.159 It follows then that the excep-
tions available to these GATT provisions should also be made available to China’s  trading 
153 In addition, GATT Art. I:1 (MFN) applies to export tariffs and all rules and formalities affecting exports.
154 GATT Art. XVII:3.
155 GATT Arts XVII:1(a) and (b).
156 See Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, 
paras 6.39, 6.89 and n. 133; Appellate Body Report, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 Sep. 2004, para. 85 (stating GATT 
Article XVII:1(a) is an ‘anti-circumvention’ provision).
157 GATT Art. II:4 also requires disclosure of information regarding the import mark-up by import monopolies on 
products that are not the subject of a tariff binding.
158 For assessment of WTO disciplines on state trading activities, see generally, Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis 
(eds), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
159 Trading rights is not a sector of services classifi ed by GATS schedules. Unlike GATT, GATS does not contain 
provisions on state trading. Instead, it focuses on the effect of monopolistic powers of service suppliers, regardless of whether 
they are owned or authorized by the State. See GATS Art. VIII, Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers.
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rights obligation, unless doing so will defeat the very purpose of the obligation or oth-
erwise render such obligation meaningless. In fact, one of the exceptions contained in 
Article XX(d) does appear to be problematic for the trading rights obligation, which 
excuses domestic regulations ‘not inconsistent with’ GATT provisions, including in par-
ticular those relating to ‘the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 
of Article II and Article XVII’. Since Articles II:4 and XVII do not limit the scope of 
state import monopolies, Chinese laws or regulations relating to the scope of its import 
monopolies would not be inconsistent with GATT; but they might be inconsistent with 
the trading rights obligation which explicitly restricts the scope of such monopolies. 
Consequently, applying the exception on state monopolies may render the trading rights 
obligation meaningless. Other than this particular clause in paragraph (d),160 the policy 
exceptions of Article XX do not appear to contradict the apparent purpose of the trad-
ing rights obligation – that is, to reduce state trading and import monopolies in China 
to a certain level so that they can be more effectively regulated by the existing GATT 
disciplines. These exceptions of Article XX, therefore, should be made available to the 
trading rights obligations. After all, the interests of public policy have been given priority 
over the interest of free trade under the WTO regime. And any potential abuse of the 
exceptions with respect to the trading rights obligation can be dealt with by the legal 
standards built in the provisions of Article XX.
As for the applicability of Article XX in this particular case, perhaps an analogy to 
GATT Article XXI Security Exceptions can better illustrate the logic of the argument. 
Similar to its policy of maintaining state import monopolies in cultural products, China 
reserves the right to trade in weaponry and military equipment exclusively to selected 
SOEs.161 Also like cultural products, weaponry and military equipment are not among 
the listed products reserved for state trading under the Protocol. Yet, no WTO Member 
is likely to challenge China’s practice as a violation of the trading rights obligation. 
The apparent legal justifi cation would be Article XXI, which exempts any action that a 
Member considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating 
to trade in arms, ammunition and other goods and materials for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment.162 If Article XXI can be used to justify state trading in goods 
that are not explicitly reserved for state trading under the Protocol, why should not 
Article XX be allowed to do the same?
160 Domestic laws and regulations not inconsistent with other provisions of the GATT should remain available as 
defense under Art. XX(d) for violations of the trading rights obligation. For instance, China could argue that maintaining 
state import monopolies in cultural products is ‘necessary to secure compliance’ with the Constitution, which sets broad 
political standards for speech and press.
161 See the Industry Catalogue, supra text at n. 100.
162 GATT Art. XXI(b)(ii).
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3.2. Distinguishing systemic commitments from commercial commitments
Because the Protocol contains broad systemic commitments of China that are unique within 
the WTO, how to interpret such commitments becomes a special challenge. The interpre-
tive objective should be to give full effect to these commitments without unduly intrud-
ing into the domestic regulatory space of China. To this end, we need to fi rst distinguish 
China’s systemic commitments from its commercial commitments and then determine the 
appropriate levels of scrutiny, or standards of review,163 to be applied to each category.
The need for appropriate standards of review under international trade law arises 
with the expansion of the world trade regime. Traditionally, the GATT system focused 
on regulation of border measures (tariffs, quotas, and customs procedures) and its regula-
tion of internal measures was limited to the requirements of nondiscrimination between 
imported and domestic products.164 The nondiscrimination requirements ensure that 
GATT disciplines on border measures will not be evaded by domestic measures (dis-
guised protectionism) but it does not interfere with the subject matter of the domestic 
regulation. With the advent of the WTO, the world trading system has greatly expanded 
its jurisdiction into traditionally domestic regulatory domains. It now regulates intel-
lectual property rights (TRIPS), health and safety standards of products (SPS and TBT), 
investment policies and domestic subsidies (GATS, TRIMS, and SCM). Under these new 
agreements, domestic laws and policies must conform to certain substantive standards; 
deviation from such standards could constitute a violation even if they were not dis-
criminatory or protectionist.165
This expansion of WTO disciplines has led to growing concerns that the WTO may 
intrude into the legitimate policy space of its Members. In order to address such con-
cerns, it is necessary to establish appropriate standards of review under the relevant WTO 
agreements.166 The Appellate Body has stated that Article 11 of the DSU, which requires 
a panel to make an ‘objective assessment’ of the facts and the applicability of the relevant 
WTO agreement, provides the appropriate standard of review for all WTO agreements 
other than the Antidumping Agreement,167 and that such ‘objective assessment’ standard 
is neither one of de novo review, nor of ‘total deference’.168 This DSU standard, however, 
163 The concept of appropriate levels of scrutiny is often used interchangeably with the concept of standards of 
review, which in the WTO context refers to the degree of deference the WTO adjudicatory body should give to the 
national authority’s factual and legal determinations. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Matthias Oesch, 
Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also, Stefan Zleptnig, ‘The 
Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority’, 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 6, no. 17 (2002), <http:/eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-017a.htm>.
164 The only exception is the transparency requirement of GATT Art. X.
165 Some considered this a paradigm shift in international trade law. See Henrik Horn & J.H.H. Weiler, ‘European 
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Textualism and its Discontent’, in The ALI Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case 
Law, ed. Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 552.
166 The standard of review effectively allocates powers between the WTO and its Members. As the Appellate Body 
observed, the appropriate standard of review must refl ect the balance established in the relevant agreement ‘between the 
jurisdictional competence conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the 
Members for themselves’. Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra n. 66, para. 115.
167 Appellate Body Report, ‘Argentina–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear’, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 
12 Jan. 2000, para. 118.
168 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra n. 66, para. 117.
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is too general to serve as a useful guide in specifi c cases.169 It has been suggested that 
the WTO should learn from domestic laws of many jurisdictions and establish differ-
ent standards of review of measures depending on the norm such measures allegedly 
violate.170 Thus, a measure allegedly compromising the basic norms of the WTO, such 
as nondiscrimination, may receive very strict scrutiny that will require the Member 
employing the measure to provide compelling reasons for justifi cation. A lower level of 
scrutiny, requiring simply that the measure not be unreasonable, may be applied in other 
circumstances, such as measures accused of not complying with international standards 
but not involving discrimination, thus giving greater deference to the national authority 
in making and applying such regulations.171 Encouragingly, recent WTO decisions appear 
to be moving in this direction.172
Because different standards of review are to be established depending on the norms 
a measure allegedly violates, a ranking of the WTO norms becomes necessary, which 
in turn will depend on our understanding of the purpose of the WTO. As convention-
ally understood, the objective of the world trading system is to liberalize trade. The 
basic norms stemming from this objective are trade liberalization, nondiscrimination, 
and transparency. But with the expansion of WTO disciplines, the objective of the trad-
ing system seems to have extended into promoting good domestic governance, such as 
the protection of property rights (IP), and of the environment and public health.173 The 
norms associated with the domestic governance model can be much more expansive 
than the conventional model of trade liberalization. For now, however, it seems safe to 
say that trade liberalization remains the primary objective of the WTO; accordingly, the 
norm of nondiscrimination (or anti-protectionism) stays at the core of the WTO disci-
plines on domestic regulations.
The question about the purpose of the WTO bears directly on the interpretation 
of the WTO-plus obligations of China. Because the Protocol does not explain its object 
and purpose, the interpretation of its provisions will need to be informed more generally 
by the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement. With respect to China’s commer-
cial commitments, such as its commitments on foreign investment and export tariffs, it 
169 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’, Journal International 
 Economic Law 7 (2004): 491 (recognizing the need for developing appropriate standards of review for different subject 
matters under WTO law); Matthias Oesch, ‘Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution’, Journal of International 
Economic Law 6 (2003): 635 (concluding that panels and the Appellate Body had generally paid little deference to Members’ 
 interpretation of the WTO agreements).
170 See Horn & Weiler, supra n. 165.
171 Id.
172 For example, the Appellate Body has articulated a clearer standard of review under Art. 5.1 of SPS, which requires 
Members’ SPS measures to be based on a risk assessment. See ‘Canada/United States – Continued Suspension of Obliga-
tions in the EC – Hormones Dispute’, WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 Nov. 2008, para. 590 (stating 
that the review power of a panel under Art. 5.1 is not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO 
Member is correct but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported by ‘coherent reasoning and respectable 
scientifi c evidence’ and ‘is, in this sense, objectively justifi able’.)
173 See Jeffrey Dunoff, ‘Lotus Eaters: Refl ection on the Varietals Dispute, the SPS Agreement and WTO Dis-
pute Resolution’, in Trade and Human Health and Safety, ed. George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 153, 173 (questioning whether the WTO is being transformed into a re-maker of 
internal regulatory systems of its Members).
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seems fairly clear that their purposes are purely to achieve trade liberalization (broadly 
construed). As such, these commitments embody the core value of the WTO system 
and their object and purpose can be fully explained by the main objective of the WTO. 
Therefore, although these commitments exceed the requirements of GATT and GATS, 
it would not be inappropriate to set the standard of review for these provisions at a 
level comparable to that applicable to the GATT and GATS provisions on market access 
(e.g., GATT Article XI, GATS Article XVI, and TRIMS).
In comparison, determining appropriate review standards for China’s systemic com-
mitments is a more complex matter. These commitments address broad systemic issues 
in China, including the pricing system, foreign trade rights, SOE autonomy, and the rule 
of law. While these issues all have a signifi cant impact on trade, they also affect domestic 
institutions and societies generally. As a result, it is not so clear as to what these commit-
ments are intended to achieve. Take for example the commitment to let market forces 
determine all domestic prices. Is the purpose of this commitment to ensure that China 
adopts a market-based economic system so that its domestic prices will not distort trade 
(the conventional trade model), or is it because such a system is considered a desired 
norm in itself (the domestic governance model), or somewhat a blend of both? Different 
understandings about the purpose of this commitment can lead to different interpreta-
tions of the commitment.
Consequently, the review standard to be applied in the context of the systemic com-
mitments may depend on the treaty interpreter’s vision of the purpose of such commit-
ments. A narrower vision (the conventional trade model) would see these commitments as 
necessary to ensure that WTO multilateral disciplines, in particular the market access and 
other commercial commitments of China, will not be eroded or rendered ineffective by 
China’s economic and regulatory system. Under this vision, the treaty interpreter would 
focus on the aim and trade effect of the Chinese measure at issue, and apply a lower level 
of scrutiny unless the measure also involves discrimination or is clearly protectionist. In con-
trast, a broader vision (the domestic governance model) would view the purpose of the sys-
temic commitments as not only to ensure the effectiveness of WTO multilateral disciplines, 
but also to help China transform into a truly market-based economy governed by rule of 
law. Adopting this broader vision, a treaty interpreter would be more inclined to apply a 
heightened standard in scrutinizing a Chinese measure accused of violating a systemic com-
mitment. This latter approach would be attractive to many people, both inside and outside 
China, who wish to see the WTO play an active role in furthering China’s domestic reform. 
But it may also backfi re if China resists compliance out of political concerns.174
The Trading Rights case provides a good example for this analysis. The question of 
standards of review arises under both the Protocol provisions (section 5) and GATT 
Article XX(a), which China invokes as an affi rmative defense. Once the Panel accepts 
174 See Arie Reich, ‘The Threat of Politicization of the World Trade Organization’, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of 
Law Working Paper No. 7-05, May 2005, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=723621> (identifying emerging signs of 
politicization of the WTO and its contributing factors, including a broadened mandate of the WTO).
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the availability of Article XX exceptions to the Protocol provisions, the focal point 
becomes the standard of review under Article XX(a). Although the Appellate Body has 
not articulated any particular standard of review for the Article XX provisions, each time 
a determination is made under the article, a particular standard of review is effectively 
used. In a given case, the interpretation of the ‘necessity’ test (which involves a ‘weigh-
ing and balancing’ process and an evaluation of what constitutes a ‘reasonable available’ 
alternative175) and of the chapeau standards (which also involves a balancing exercise176) 
all refl ects the review standard actually applied by the WTO adjudicatory body.
Thus, in deciding whether the Chinese measures meet the requirements of Article XX, 
the treaty interpreter may well interpret these requirements through the lens of his vision 
on the purpose of China’s trading rights commitment.177 Adopting the narrower vision 
(the conventional trade model), the interpreter would focus on the question of whether 
China’s measures are protectionist in design and the restrictive impact of such measures 
on trade. As previously discussed, the Chinese measures are motivated by political rather 
than economic reasons.178 While the measures deny trading rights to all foreign entities, 
they also deny the same to the vast majority of Chinese entities. Hence, these measures 
are not discriminatory in the sense of being protectionist against foreign competition. 
In terms of trade impact, because the measures do not seem to restrict the quantity of 
cultural imports, their restrictive impact on trade appears to be rather limited. Given the 
political nature and limited trade impact of the measures, the treaty interpreter would 
apply a lower level of scrutiny, which would lead him to give greater deference to 
China’s policy choice in implementing its censorship regime.
In contrast, if the treaty interpreter adopts the broader vision (the domestic gover-
nance model), seeing the purpose of the trading rights commitments as to facilitate the 
market-based systemic reform in China, he would scrutinize the measures more strictly 
even if he also agrees that the measures are not protectionist in design. In fact, when the 
United States submitted that the Chinese measures deny trading rights not only to ‘all 
foreign enterprises and individuals’, but also to ‘all Chinese enterprises’ (other than the 
175 See supra text at nn. 111–115.
176 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/
AB/R, adopted 6 Nov. 1998, para. 159 (stating that the task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is ‘essentially the deli-
cate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium’ between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under 
Art. XX and the rights of other Members under varying substantive provisions of GATT.)
177 Cf. Alan Sykes observed that in WTO practice the least trade restrictive means or the necessity test under 
Art. XX is merely ‘a crude form of cost-benefi t analysis’, rather than a method to detect protectionism. Alan O. Sykes, ‘The 
Least Restrictive Means’, University Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 403. Commentators have expressed different understand-
ings of the WTO ‘necessity’ jurisprudence. See, e.g., Jan Neumann & Elisabeth Turk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality 
in World Trade Organization Law after Korea–Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines’, Journal of World Trade 37 (2003): 
199–233; Donald H. Regan, ‘The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of 
Cost-Benefi t Balancing’, World Trade Review 6, no. 3 (2007): 347–369; Chad P. Brown & Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Brazil – Mea-
sures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act’, World Trade Review 8, no. 1 (2009): 85–135; Benn McGrady, 
‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures’, Journal 
of International Economic Law 12, no. 1 (2009): 153–173.
178 See Part 2.2.2(a).
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selected SOEs),179 it effectively advocated this broader understanding of the purpose of 
China’s systemic commitments.
Ultimately, the normative question confronting the WTO adjudicatory body in this 
case is whether to allow China to maintain, in its policing of foreign cultural products, 
the degree of control and fl exibility afforded by the exclusive state trading. Should they 
answer the question in the negative, China would be required under WTO law to make 
certain fundamental changes in the operation of its censorship regime. Rarely before has 
the WTO/GATT system been involved in making a decision that intrudes so deeply into 
a Member’s political system. It would be a remarkable achievement of the WTO if its dis-
pute settlement mechanism could induce the Chinese government to reform its censor-
ship regime. More likely, however, China would resist compliance. In that event, a more 
practical solution or compromise might be to differentiate the types of cultural imports 
according to their political sensitivity. For instance, China may well agree to liberalize 
trading rights in science and technology publications, which count for more than one 
third of all imported books in China. This solution would be in line with the outcome of 
the Xinhua case, in which China differentiated fi nancial information from general news 
and accepted liberalization in the distribution of the former but not the latter.180 
3.3. Giving due consideration to china’s intention
In one sense, WTO-plus obligations are analogous to the market-access concessions in 
GATT and GATS schedules, as they are all commitments made by one Member, but form 
an integral part of the multilateral WTO agreements. It has been well accepted under 
WTO law that, although each schedule represents concessions that bind one Member 
only, it also represents ‘a common agreement among all Members’.181 Thus, like the task 
of interpreting any other treaty text, the task of interpreting a GATT or GATS schedule 
is to ascertain ‘the common intentions’ of Members.182 These common intentions cannot 
be ascertained on the basis of ‘subjective and unilaterally determined’ expectation of one 
Member, because the concessions are ‘reciprocal and result from a mutually-advantageous 
negotiation’ between Members.183
Some commentators have suggested, however, that GATT and GATS schedules 
are instruments of de facto unilateral nature,184 or are ‘multilateral acts of a special 
character’,185 and as such, their interpretation process should be somewhat different from 
that of interpreting the provisions of GATT or GATS. When engaged in identifying the 
‘common intention’ behind a Member’s concession, the treaty interpreter ‘cannot avoid 
179 ‘U.S. Request for Consultations’, WT/DS363/1, supra n. 90.
180 See supra text at nn. 134–135.
181 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classifi cation of Certain Computer Equipment,  WT/DS62, 
67, 68/AB/R, adopted 22 Jun. 1998, para. 109.
182 Id., para. 84; Appellate Body Report, US–Gambling, para. 160.
183 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
184 Ortino, supra n. 67, 123–124.
185 Isabelle Van Damme, ‘The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments’, Journal World Trade 41, no. 1 
(2007): 1, 19.
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taking into account the unilateral origin of such concession as well as the existence of 
concessions of all other Members’.186 While the schedules should be interpreted as part 
of the treaty language of the WTO agreements, the hybrid feature of their negotiation, 
drafting and conclusion ‘may infl uence the weight given to certain means of interpreta-
tion in the VCLT’.187 Indeed, it has been observed that WTO adjudicators have shown 
more fl exibility in the interpretation of the schedules than the provisions of the WTO 
agreements.188
Compared to the scheduled concessions, the de facto unilateral character of the 
Protocol obligations is, in a sense, more pronounced. This can be observed from several 
aspects. First of all, unlike scheduled concessions of one Member, which are negotiated 
in exchange for concessions of other Members on a roughly reciprocal basis, the Proto-
col obligations of China do not have quid pro quo from other Members. The accession 
negotiations are not ‘a process of reciprocal demands and concessions, of ‘give and take’, 
the way tariff negotiations are.189 While China did accept all the special obligations of the 
Protocol in exchange for the overall benefi t of WTO membership, these special obliga-
tions are not ‘reciprocal’ in the same sense as the scheduled concessions.
Moreover, in the reality of WTO accession negotiations, the applicant country does 
not stand on an equal footing with the existing Members. The way in which accession 
is conducted provides the existing Members, especially major trading powers, with great 
leverage to pressure the applicant into making as many concessions as possible, including 
special commitments not required of existing Members.190 In the case of China, many 
of the special terms of the Protocol resulted from bilateral negotiations between China 
and the United States, in which the United States enjoyed more bargaining power than 
China and was able to squeeze out special concessions through high-handed negotiating 
tactics.191 The lack of experience and legal expertise on the part of China also inevitably 
constrained its ability to assert its interests in the drafting of the Protocol. Thus, while 
the Protocol may be regarded as refl ecting the overall balance between the rights and 
obligations of China and other Members, such a balance was not established in the same 
manner as that in the GATT or GATS schedules.
Furthermore, the Protocol provisions are ‘rules’ that may not be periodically rene-
gotiated or withdrawn as the scheduled concessions could.192 As previously discussed, it 
186 Ortino, supra n. 67, 124.
187 Van Damme, supra n. 185, 52.
188 Id., 48 (observing that the Appellate Body seemed to accept, in part, deference to ‘WTO Member-specifi c’ means 
of interpretation for schedules, which it would otherwise reject as interpretive means for the interpretation of other WTO 
covered agreements).
189 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109.
190 See Charnovitz, supra n. 2, 55–56 (quoting critical views of the accession process from Roman Grynberg & 
Roy Michey Joy, ‘The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO’, Journal of World Trade 34, no. 6 (2000): 159; Maxim Medvedkov, 
‘WTO Accession: The Russian Perspective’, in UNCTAD, WTO Accessions and Development Policies, UNCTAD, CITC/
TNCD/11 (2001): 47).
191 See ‘To Brink and Back: In Historic Pact, US Opens Way for China to Finally Join WTO’, Wall Street Journal, 16 
Nov. 1999, A1; ‘Roller-Coaster Ride’ to an Off-Again, On-Again Trade Pact’, The Washington Post, 16 Nov. 1999, A26; ‘The 
Fist Lady of Trade: Woman in the News Charlene Barshefsky: The US trade representative was praised after China’s acces-
sion to the WTO’, Financial Times (London), 27 Nov. 1999, 11.
192 GATT Art. XXVIII; GATS Art. XXI.
 THE CHALLENGE OF INTERPRETING ‘WTO-PLUS’ PROVISIONS  169
is not even clear how the Protocol provisions may be amended legally. As a result, the 
Protocol obligations impose a heavier burden on China than that imposed by the sched-
ules on the concession-making Member.
The question, then, is whether the special character of the Protocol obligations, and 
the circumstances surrounding their negotiation, drafting and conclusion, should infl u-
ence their interpretation (a normative question), and if so, how (a technical question). 
I believe the answer must be affi rmative to the normative question because only by tak-
ing into account the reality of the Protocol can the treaty interpreter work consciously 
towards reaching an equitable result that is critical to the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the WTO system.
Regarding the technical question, the short answer will be that the treaty interpreter 
should give due consideration to China’s intention. What this entails are two things. First, 
in the process of ascertaining the ‘common intentions’ behind a Protocol provision, the 
treaty interpreter needs to identify China’s intention separately through examination of 
all relevant evidence as part of the contextual analysis of the provision. Conceptually, the 
‘common intentions’ behind a Protocol provision should be understood as the mutual 
intention between China on the one hand and all other WTO Members, collectively, 
on the other.193 While it is not necessary to investigate the intent of each individual 
Member so as to establish the collective intention of the WTO Members, it will always 
be necessary to identify the intent of China in order to determine the mutual intention 
behind a Protocol provision. After all, the ‘common intentions’ regarding a Protocol obli-
gation cannot go beyond what China intended.194 Of course, China’s intention cannot 
be determined on the basis of its post hoc assertions. Instead, it has to be determined 
objectively – through careful examination of all relevant evidence within the parameters 
of the VCLT rules.
Second, when there is doubt about the scope of a Protocol obligation, such 
obligation should be interpreted narrowly. In this regard, inspiration can be drawn 
from the interpretive principle of binding unilateral declarations of the State, adopted 
by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations in 2006, which 
states:195
A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear and 
specifi c terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a decla-
ration, such obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. In interpreting the content of 
such obligations, weight shall be given fi rst and foremost to the text of the declaration, together 
with the context and the circumstances in which it was formulated.
193 This understanding refl ects the bilateral nature of the Protocol.
194 Interestingly, the reverse may not be true in light of the unilateral character of the Protocol obligations. It is at 
least theoretically possible that objective evidence will show that China actually intended to undertake a broader obligation 
than expected by other WTO Members under a particular Protocol provision.
195 Guiding Principle 7, Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of State capable of creating legal obligations, 
with commentaries thereto, adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in its 58th session in 2006, 
ILC Report, A/61/10 (2006).
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The ILC Commentary explains that this principle is formulated on the basis of a num-
ber of judgments of the International Court of Justice concerning unilateral acts of the 
States.196 In the view of the Court, the VCLT provisions may only apply ‘analogously to 
the extent compatible’ with the sui generis character of a unilateral declaration. By anal-
ogy of Article 31(1) of the VCLT, ‘priority consideration must be given to the text of the 
unilateral declaration, which best refl ects its author’s intentions’. In addition, by analogy 
of Article 31(2), ‘to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must 
be taken of all the circumstances in which the act occurred’.197 Thus, the interpretation 
of unilateral obligations follows a two-part principle. First, when the scope of a unilateral 
obligation is in doubt, that obligation must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. This 
is essentially the principle of restrictive interpretation, or in dubio mitius.198 Second, the 
intention of the State obligor should be determined by examining primarily the text of 
the declaration, together with the ‘context’ and ‘all the circumstances’ in which it was 
made. This part is an analogy of the principle in Article 31 VCLT, but with an added 
emphasis on the ‘circumstances’ surrounding the unilateral act.
The Protocol, of course, is not a unilateral instrument, but a negotiated agreement 
between China and the WTO, with virtually all of its special provisions originating from 
demands of other WTO Members. However, to the extent that the Protocol obligations 
of China differ from and exceed the obligations of all other Members under the WTO 
Agreement, such obligations have acquired a distinct unilateral character. It is in this 
sense that the interpretive principle of unilateral obligations can have a reference value.
Technically, in interpreting the Protocol, the reference value of the interpretive 
principle for unilateral obligations can be realized by the weight given to certain means 
of interpretation under the VCLT. For example, with respect to the added emphasis on 
the ‘circumstances’ surrounding the formulation of the text, it is possible for the inter-
preter to take into account such circumstances under either Article 31 or 32 of the 
VCLT. In the context of Article 31, the Appellate Body has already opened such pos-
sibility when it stated:
The ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances 
of each case. Importantly, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be seen in the light of the 
intention of the parties ‘as expressed in the words used by them against the light of the surrounding 
circumstances’.199 (emphasis added)
This view refl ects a contextualist approach in the application of Article 31. Moreover, 
under Article 32, ‘the circumstances’ of the conclusion of a treaty is one of the two 
196 Id., Commentary (2) and (3) (citing Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), ICJ Report 1974; 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), ICJ Report 1986; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 
Merits, Judgment of 4 Dec. 1998, ICJ Report 1998; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v 
Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 Jun. 1998, ICJ Reports 1998). 
197 Id., Commentary (3) (citing Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 453, para. 46; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. 
Republic of Mali), 574, para. 40).
198 For detailed discussion of the principle, see Gardiner, supra n. 147, 60–61, and 349.
199 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 175 (quoting Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1961) 365).
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supplementary means of interpretation specifi cally identifi ed. Such circumstances have 
been construed broadly so that they may include the historical background against which 
a treaty was negotiated,200 prior consistent practice of one party,201 events, unilateral acts, 
and statements of individual negotiating parties,202 subsequent practice of one party,203 
and domestic legislative acts and court decisions.204 Given the lack of ‘the preparatory 
work’ of the Protocol (which is the other supplementary means specifi cally identifi ed 
by Article 32), this broad construction of ‘the circumstances’ will prove very helpful in 
its interpretation. In sum, when applying the VCLT rules, WTO adjudicators will have 
ample room to take into account the circumstances in which the Protocol provisions 
were negotiated, drafted and concluded.
As for the principle of in dubio mitius, the Appellate Body has already embraced it as a 
‘supplementary means of interpretation’ widely recognized in international law.205 Pursuant 
to this principle, ‘if the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred 
which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation’.206 The notion underlying the 
principle is deference to the sovereignty of states. As the Appellate Body explained, ‘[w]
e cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose on themselves the more 
onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation’.207 Although some jurists have ques-
tioned the value of in dubio mitius in treaty interpretation,208 this principle has been given 
a particular importance in the interpretation of unilateral declarations. Given the de facto 
unilateral character of the Protocol obligations, the WTO adjudicator should not hesitate 
to resort to this principle when the scope of a Protocol obligation is in doubt.
In addition, I would suggest that the WTO adjudicators utilize supplementary means 
of interpretation more readily in the interpretation of the Protocol provisions. In contrast 
to Article 31, which sets out general interpretive principles that are obligatory, Article 32 
merely provides the treaty interpreter with the option of recourse to supplementary means 
of interpretation. And it does not contain an exhaustive list of supplementary means.209 The 
200 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 86.
201 Id., paras 92–93 and 95 (stating that consistent prior classifi cation practice of one party is often signifi cant, 
whereas inconsistent practice is not relevant). 
202 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 289.
203 Id., para. 305 (stating that it is possible that documents published, events occurring and practice followed sub-
sequent to the conclusion of the treaty may give an indication of what were or were not the common intentions of the 
parties at the time of the conclusion).
204 Id., paras 308–309.
205 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, n. 154.
206 Id. (quoting from Robert Jennings &Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn (London: Longmans, 
1992), I, 1278).
207 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 165 (criticizing the Panel for interpreting Art. 3.1 of the SPS as 
containing binding norms rather than expressing a goal to be realized in the future). 
208 See Gardiner, supra n. 147, 60–61 (discussing Hersch Lauterpacht’s view in ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the 
Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) XXVI BYBIL 48); John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, 
and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 262 (suggesting that the 
concept of in dubio mitius represents ‘extreme positivism’ and is ‘absurd and destructive of purposes of institutions like the 
GATT and WTO’).
209 Article 32 provides: ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confi rm the meaning resulting from the application 
of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambigu-
ous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’
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purpose of the recourse to supplementary means is either to ‘confi rm’ the meaning result-
ing from the application of Article 31, or to ‘determine’ the meaning if the application of 
Article 31 leaves ambiguity or leads to a manifestly unreasonable result. In practice, panels 
and the Appellate Body have resorted to Article 32 from time to time, especially when 
they considered the recourse as ‘necessary’, that is, when the meaning remains unclear 
or leads to an absurd result after the application of Article 31.210 Given the imperfectly 
formulated text of the Protocol, it may be  necessary for the WTO adjudicator to employ 
supplementary means even when the meaning of a Protocol provision appears to be clear 
as a result of applying Article 31.211 A liberal approach towards recourse to supplementary 
means would allow the interpreter to take into account the special character of the Pro-
tocol obligations and to ensure that China’s intention be properly identifi ed.
4. Conclusion
The interpretive challenge presented by the Protocol provisions is substantial. At the techni-
cal level, the text of the Protocol is drafted in such a way that creates large gaps in the WTO 
treaties that have to be fi lled by the treaty interpreter. At the policy level, there is probably not 
another multilateral treaty under which the obligations of one member differ from those of all 
others in such a signifi cant manner. And that member happens to be one of the largest trading 
nations in the world. Consequently, whether the Protocol obligations are interpreted properly 
can have major implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the WTO system.
The challenge of interpreting the Protocol provisions, on the other hand, also provides 
a great opportunity for the WTO adjudicatory body to emancipate itself from the con-
straints of a rigid textualist approach and to truly embrace a holistic and systemic approach 
in its stead. The VCLT principles are suffi ciently general to allow the treaty interpreter to 
develop additional tools and skills in the interpretation of a particular treaty so as to achieve 
a desired result. More recent decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body have already 
shown increasing fl exibility in the application of the VCLT principles. What is needed most 
in the interpretation of the Protocol is perhaps the willingness of the WTO adjudicators to 
adopt a broad systemic view of its unique provisions and to articulate the underlying policy 
considerations for their decisions. A more systemic and policy-oriented judicial policy will 
better serve the objective of providing security and predictability to the WTO system.
210 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy 
Products, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, adopted 27 Oct. 1999, para. 138 (because the language is not clear on 
its face, it is ‘appropriate’ and ‘indeed necessary’ to turn to supplementary means pursuant to Art. 32); Appellate Body 
Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 Mar. 2005, para. 623 (agreeing with 
the Panel that the meaning of the text is clear and therefore recourse to negotiating history is ‘not necessary’, but did take 
into account of the negotiating history); Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 Dec. 2002, paras 89–90 (since the inter-
pretation does not lead to ‘irrational or absurd results’, it is not ‘strictly necessary’ to have recourse to supplementary means 
identifi ed in Art. 32, but considered negotiating history any way).
211 When the interpreter uses supplementary means to ‘confi rm’ a clear meaning, the process also carries with it the 
possibility that the meaning cannot be so confi rmed, which may lead to adjustment to the assumption that the meaning 
was clear. See Gardiner, supra n. 147, 307–310.
